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INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND PERSONAL INTEGRITYt
ROBERT ALLEN SEDLER*
THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
The law must deal with a variety of human experiences and needs.
Potentially its grasp may reach to all facets of human existence. Much
of its protection is tacit and taken for granted. The assurance of legal
protection for violation of certain interests is one of the criteria of a
civilized society and makes day-to-day living possible. But when there
is the need for overt legal protection, the weaknesses of the legal process
become evident. There are limitations on the power of society through
a judicial tribunal to compel certain types of conduct. Further defi-
ciencies appear in the process as it is administered. Nowhere are these
points demonstrated more saliently than in the area of protection of
personal interests.
When people cannot satisfactorily adjust personal relationships, their
resort to the legal processes must be accompanied by an awareness
that the law cannot be a substitute for a properly functioning inter-
relationship with others. This is because the device the law is most
capable of employing to protect interests is the awarding of a sum of
money. From the earliest order for the payment of "weregild" to the
present judgment for damages, Anglo-Saxon law, in its development as
contrasted with that of the Roman law, has placed great emphasis upon
appeasement through the payment of money. The genesis of the law of
intentional torts was the necessity to appease injured dignity. Thus,
substantial sums of money were awarded for things such as an assault
or a slight battery to "buy off" the insulted party and insure that he
would not "satisfy his honor" beyond the legal processes.'
. As law evolves from the "strict stage," 2 it becomes recognized that a
different function may be served. It is recognized that money may not
be an adequate remedy for the interference with certain interests. Our
legal system is complicated by the fact that most of the protection
afforded by means other than the payment of money was originally
administered by a separate court.8 This development in the "stage of
t The author wishes to express his appreciation to William Brand, Esq. of the Missouri
Bar, who, while a senior law student at Saint Louis University, assisted the author in the
research for this article.
a Associate Professor of Law (on leave of absence) Saint Louis University School of
Law; Assistant Dean of Haile Sellassie I University, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Faculty of
Law, 1964-1965. Professor Sedler received his A.B. degree in 1956 and his LL.B. degree in
1959 from the University of Pittsburgh.
1. For an excellent discussion of the historical relationship between tort and criminal
law, see Bohlen, Consent as Affecting Civil Liability for Breaches of the Peace, 24 CoLUM.
L. Rav. 819 (1924).
2. POUND, THE Spmrr OF THE COMMON LAW 140 (1921).
3. For a discussion of some of the undesirable complications in the remedies area see
Sedler, Conditional, Experimental and Substitutional Relief, 16 RUTGERS L. Rav. 639 (1962).
See particularly the discussion of conditional relief in actions historically denominated as
"legal" at 711-15.
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liberalization" 4 had an inhibiting effect on the proper protection of
personal interests by way of specific relief, which has not been fully
eliminated in the "stage of maturity." 5
What happened was simply that the "equity court," which granted
most of the specific relief our law recognized,6 took the position that
"equity protects only property rights." 7 Hence, specific relief was not
available to protect a personal interest unless the particular personal
interest could be assimilated with a property one. Since the concept of a
property right, however, did not have an economic meaning, it was not
difficult for the courts to treat certain personal interests such as the
privacy of one's letters as a property right." On the other hand, more
substantial personal interests, such as a man's reputation, were refused
protection because they did not involve a property right.,
The commentators bent their energies to proving that "equity could
protect personal rights." Dean Pound's classic article10 develops the
point at great length. Although he discussed to some extent the sound-
ness of injunctive relief in particular situations, the main emphasis was
on the necessity for the courts to abandon this artificial distinction and
cease "proceeding upon fictions and technical bases of jurisdiction."
Another writer went to great length to show that equity really had the
power to protect personal rights and that the cases denying relief
because of the absence of a property right could be explained on other
grounds?
This is now all pass6. This is not to say, that vestiges do not survive,
nor that in some instances the court will not consider personal interests
sufficient to be protected while they will consider similar economic
interests entitled to such protection. With the merger of law and equity
becoming more and more a reality despite some undesirable relics,12
the question is now what personal interests will be protected by way of
4. POUND, supra note 2, at 141.
5. Id. at 142.
6. The law courts granted only replevin and ejectment and at a later stage of develop-
ment the "extraordinary legal remedies" such as mandamus, prohibition, and quo
warran to.
7. See Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swantson (Chan.) 402 (1818).
8. Ibid.
9. See Brandreth v. Lance, 8 Paige (N.Y. Chan.) 24 (1839). After Prudential Assurance
Co. v. Knott, Law Reports, 10 Chan. App. 142 (1875), this apparently represented the
common law of England, in effect overruling or severely restricting the holding in Dixon
v. Holden, Law Reports, 7 Eq. Cases 488 (1869). The English practice has been changed
by statute. See the discussion in CArFrr AND RE, EQUITY 1133 n.27 (1958).
10. Pound, Equitable Relief against Defamation and Injuries to Personality, 29 HARV.
L REV. 640 (1916).
11. Long, Equitable Jurisdiction to Protect Personal Rights, 33 YALE L.J. 115 (1923).
Some of the grounds of explanation seem most specious. The concept of "equity jurisdic-
tion" has no place in a merged system except as regards the trial by jury guarantee. Some
of the other articles dealing with the subject are Walsh, Equitable Protection of Personal
Rights, 7 N.Y.U.L.Q. 878 (1930); de Funiak, Equitable Protection of Personal or Individual
Rights, 36 Ky. L.J. 7 (1947); Bennett, Injunctive Protection of Personal Interests-A
Factual Approach, 1 LA. L. REv. 665 (1939); Moreland, Injunctive Control of Family Rela-
tions, 18 Ky. L.J. 207 (1930); Moscovitz, Civil Liberties and Injunctive Protection, 39
ILL. L. REv. 144 (1944).
12. See supra note S.
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injunction and under what circumstances, rather than whether "equity
has jurisdiction to protect personal rights." Some courts have long rec-
ognized that this was the question. In Stark v. Hamilton,8 for example,
the court ordered the defendant to cease living with the plaintiff's
minor daughter and observed:
It is difficult to understand why injunctive protection of a mere prop-
erty right should be placed above similar protection from continual
humiliation of the father and the reputation' of the family. In some
instances the former may be adequately compensated in damages . . .
but the latter is irreparable. 1'4
In Itzkovitch v. Whitaker,15 the court enjoined the police from plac-
ing the photo of an arrested person in a rogues gallery prior to convic-
tion, stating that "[a] personal grievance constitutes ground for an
interference of equity. Individual rights may be protected in a Court
of Equity and the officers can be restrained by injunction." 16 And in
Hawks v. Yancey,17 the court enjoined a rejected suitor from harassing
his former mistress. It held that any limitation on the power of "equity"
to protect personal rights was removed by statute and that -the court
was not constrained to search for a property right before granting
relief. It noted that "The personal rights of citizens are infinitely more
sacred and are of more value than things that are measured by dollars
and cents." 18
In succeeding years a number of courts have expressly repudiated
any notion that the court must search for a "property right" before it
can award injunctive relief. In Kenyon v. City of Chicopee,'9 the court
held that the constitutional interference with religious liberty and free
expression by government officials could be enjoined following the lead
of the United States Supreme Court, which held in Hague v. C.I.O., 20
that the federal courts could enjoin unconstitutional action violating
personal rights. The court succinctly stated the modern approach:
We believe the true rule to be that equity2' will protect personal
rights by injunction upon the same conditions upon which it will protect
property rights by injunction. In general, these conditions are, that
unless relief is granted a substantial right of the plaintiff will be im-
paired to a material degree; that the remedy at law is inadequate; 22
and that injunctive relief can be applied with practical success and
without imposing an impossible burden on the court or bringing its
processes into disrepute.2
13. 149 Ga. 227, 99 S.E. 861 (1919).
14. 99 S.E. at 862.
15. 117 La. 708, 42 So. 228 (1906).
16. 42 So. at 229, quoting secondhand from People v. Board, 55 N.Y. 390 (1874).
17. 265 S.W. 233 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
18. 265 S.W. at 237.
19. 320 Mass. 528, 70 N.E.2d 241 (1946).
20. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
21. It would be better if this term were not used. The court-which under a merged
system has succeeded to the powers of both the former law and equity courts--can protect
these as all other rights.
22. Damages or other remedies such as defense to criminal prosecution.
23. 70 N.E.2d at 244.
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This approach has also been explicitly adopted in decisions by the
highest courts of Alabama,2 4 California,25 the District of Columbia 2
and Pennsylvania.27 Nor is there any recent case where the highest state
court has explicitly adhered to the distinction. We may accept the fact
that it is doubtful today if too many courts look to find a technical
property right.
Let us then review the modem approach. First, the conduct of the
defendant must constitute a substantive wrong.2 For example, if the
conduct of the defendant does not constitute an invasion of privacy
that is recognized in the particular jurisdiction, there can be no ques-
tion of any relief. It may be asked in how many of the cases where
injunctive relief was refused on the ground that "equity protects only
property rights," there was no substantive right at all. Secondly, the
plaintiff must be entitled to injunctive relief. The particular inter-
est must be of such a type that the power to grant such relief with its
severe sanctions for non-compliance and the increased amount of judi-
cial supervision that such relief entails, should be employed. Moreover,
he must show that damages and other remedies are inadequate, just as
must any plaintiff seeking injunctive relief. Finally, he must show that
it is practicable to order injunctive relief. The court must consider the
feasibility of enforcement and other similar factors.29 And, of course,
the traditional defenses such as improper conduct or laches or the pub-
lic interest are available to the defendant.
One writer 0 has suggested that the "property right" theory is desir-
able, since in the cases where the courts want to deny relief, they can
say, "Relief denied because of the absence of a property right," and
where they want to grant relief, they can find a technical property
right.3 1 Admittedly, courts have been doing this to a great extent., He
also observes that, "The property requirement has not operated to
obstruct justice." 8s As the discussion will demonstrate, this simply is
not borne out. Moreover, this writer has never been able to see the
utility of the courts' saying one thing and doing another. Where the
interest is not of a sufficient nature to be entitled to any protection or
to injunctive protection, the court can so state. Where it is impractical
to grant specific relief, the courts can say this just as they do in other
cases.84 Honesty of judicial verbalization will furnish a more accurate
24. Knighton v. Knighton, 252 Ala. 520, 41 So. 2d 172 (1949).
25. Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club, 30 Cal. 2d 110, 180 P.2d 321 (1947).
26. Berrien v. Pollitzer, 165 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
27. Everett v. Harron, 380 Pa. 123, 110 A.2d 383 (1955).
28. See the discussion of this in Bennett, supra note 11, at 669, and Moscovitz, supra
note 11, at 146.
29. See the discussion ibid.
30. Bennett, supra note 11, at 668.
31. Ibid.
32. See the discussion in Pound, supra note 10, at 678; de Funiak, supra note 11, at 9.
33. Bennett, supra note 11, at 668.
34. Courts will not specifically enforce contracts that are too indefinite to form the
basis of a practicable decree. Gulbenkian v. Gulbenkian, 147 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1945). Nor
will they enforce certain contracts requiring continuous supervision. Marble Co. v.
[V/ol. 9:147
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guide to lawyers and lower court judges than judicial "caginess." The
approach adopted by the courts in the more modem cases treats injunc-
tive relief as subject to the same considerations whether the nature of
the interest sought to be protected is "true property," "fictional prop-
erty," or outright personal. By this attitude we can preserve the desir-
able results of the older cases while eliminating the undesirable ones.
Once we fully abandon the "personal-property" dichotomy, we will
spend less psychic energy trying to find a charismatic interest and decide
whether under the circumstances injunctive protection should be
afforded to a real interest. The courts are moving rapidly in this direc-
tion, which is a hallmark of the maturity stage of legal development.
Our concern then is with the availability of injunctive relief to pro-
tect personal integrity. We have broadly classified the interests we will
discuss into five categories: (1) The right to reputation; (2) The right
to be let alone; (3) The right to family relations; (4) The right to
associational relations; and (5) Civil Rights. We will ordinarily not
discuss whether the interest is recognized as a matter of substantive law,
though in some instances where the only type of protection that can be
afforded is by injunctive relief, we will discuss the substantive nature
of that interest. Our concern will be primarily with invasions by pri-
vate persons, though in some circumstances we will discuss invasions by
government officials. A strong concern, as the discussion will indicate,
will be with the practicability of granting injunctive relief and other
countervailing policies which may make the granting of such relief to
protect personal instances unwise. This emphasis should in no wise
lessen what is considered to be the main thrust of this writing-that
whenever feasible, injunctive relief should be available to protect
personal integrity.
THE RIGHT TO GOOD REPUTATION
It is the classic view that publication of matters injuring the personal
reputation of the plaintiff will not be enjoined, even though admittedly
damages are inadequate due to their highly speculative nature where
injury to reputation is involved. The earliest case in this country
involving the question was Brandreth v. Lance.85 There the complaint
alleged that the defendant, a former employee of the plaintiff, was
planning to publish a book about the plaintiff, libelling him. The
court held that the complaint alleged no injury to property rights and
therefore, "equity had no jurisdiction." The court further observed
that it could not "assume jurisdiction" without infringing upon the
liberty of the press. Since today it is clear that the court can protect
Ripley, 77 U.S. 339 (1870); Edelen v. W. B. Samuels & Co., 126 Ky. 295, 103 S.W. 360
(1907); cf. Edison Illuminating Co. v. Eastern Pennsylvania Power Co., 253 Pa. 457, 98
At. 652 (1916). There is no need to obfuscate the reason why injunctive relief is refused
when the real reason is that it is impracticable to grant it.
35. Supra note 9.
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personal rights by way of injunction, that much of the case is no longer
sound. But what of the second ground? Would an injunction against
the publication of a libel be unconstitutional as a prior restraint on
free expression? Again the answer is clear today: an injunction against
publication is not necessarily unconstitutional as a prior restraint,
though it may be in a particular case. The Blackstonian view that
liberty of the press means "the absence of restraints upon publication
in advance as distinguished from liability, civil or criminal, for libelous
or improper matter, when published," a6 has never been accepted in
this country. Although it is recognized that the guarantee of free expres-
sion does not prevent civil actions for damages due to libel,3 7 it is
equally well-settled that governmental action may be unconstitutional
as a restraint on expression even when the action takes place subse-
quent to publication.8
So too, a prior restraint on publication is not necessarily unconstitu-
tional, though with a subsequent restraint, it may be. The Court would
be more likely to find a prior restraint unconstitutional, since in that
situation the expression is never heard. This was emphasized by the
Supreme Court in Near v. Minnesota,89 where it declared unconstitu-
tional a Minnesota statute authorizing the courts to enjoin future
publication of newspapers on the ground that past issues had been
-libelous. It is interesting to note that in that case the Court observed it
was not concerned with "questions as to the extent of authority to pre-
vent publications in order to protect private rights according to the prin-
ciples governing the exercise of the jurisdiction of courts of equity." 40
However, the Court has upheld injunctions against boycotts, even
though they consisted of publishing statements that people should not
use the plaintiff's products. 41 It has upheld injunctions against illegal
picketing,4 2 even though picketing comes within the guarantee of free
expression.4 8 Courts, both state and federal, have long enjoined dispar-
36. IV BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 152 (Tucker ed. 1803).
37. Justice Black has stated that he is of the opinion that the first amendment bars
such actions. See Black, A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rrv. 549, 557 (1962).
38. This was recognized as early as Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). For a
case holding criminal punishment unconstitutional see De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353
(1937). As applied to contempt of court proceedings see Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367(1947).
39. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
40. 283 U.S. at 716.
41. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove and Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911). The Court
observed that:
But we will not enter upon a discussion of the constitutional question raised for the
general provisions of the injunction did not in terms restrain any form of publica-
tion. The defendant's attack on this part of the injunction raises no question as to an
abridgement of free speech, but involves the power of a court of equity to enjoin the
defendants from continuing a boycott which by words and signals, printed or spoken,
caused or threatened irreparable damage. 221 U.S. at 436.
The Court referred to the conduct as constituting "verbal acts."
42. See, e.g., Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949); Hughes v.
Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950); International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc.,
354 U.S. 284 (1957).
43. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); American Federation of Labor v. Swing,
312 U.S. 321 (1941).
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agement of property, even though the restraint on free expression is
the same as is involved in an injunction against personal defamation. 44
Finally, in Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown,45 the Court held that the
state could constitutionally enjoin the publication of obscene works,
since they did not come within the protection of the first and fourteenth
amendments.
No suggestion is made here that defamation does not come within
the protection of the guarantee of free expression.46 It is earnestly sub-
mitted that it does. All that is contended is that it is not necessarily
unconstitutional to issue an injunction against expression in a particu-
lar case. As the Court observed in Kingsley Books v. Brown, "The
phrase, 'prior restraint,' is not a self-wielding sword. Nor can it serve
as a talismanic test." 47 Since the courts have found nothing inherently
unconstitutional about issuing injunctions against other forms of
expression, so too there is nothing inherently unconstitutional about
issuing an injunction against defamation.48
However, there is a common law policy in favor of free expression.
Even though it might not be unconstitutional to issue an injunction
against a particular piece of defamation, nonetheless, the court should
hesitate before imposing a prior restraint upon defamation. As will be
shown, the courts have now become more reluctant to issue injunctions
against disparagement. We will approach the problem in terms of
common-law policy rather than in terms of constitutionality, though
it will be indicated where an injunction against defamation is thought
to be unconstitutional. Absent such a situation we will assume that the
granting of an injunction in the particular case would be constitutional.
At this juncture a word should be said about Fox's Libel Act,49
which guaranteed that the jury could determine the truth or falsity of
the publication. In at least one state, Missouri, Fox's Libel Act has
been used to justify the refusal to issue an injunction against personal
defamation. 50 Dean Pound has demonstrated that the purpose of the
Act was to leave the question of libel to the jury, since judges were
often deciding the question as a matter of law when 'there could be
44. See the discussion infra, notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
45. 354 U.S. 436 (1959).
46. But note that in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952), the Court held that
"race libel" did not come within the protection of the first amendment. The result is
questionable, and it is submitted that the case will not be extended.
47. 354 U.S. at 441.
48. See also the discussion in Pound, supra note 10, at 655, and Walsh, supra note 11, at
883, to the effect that an injunction against personal defamation would not necessarily be
unconstitutional.
49. 52 Geo. 111, ch. 60 (1792).
50. Ryan v. City of Warrensburg, 342 Mo. 761, 117 S.W.2d 303 (1938); Wolf v. Harris,
267 Mo. 405, 184 S.W. 1139 (1916). But Fox's Libel Act is not a bar to an injunction against
verbal acts designed to interfere with advantageous relationships, such as inducing the
plaintiff's customers to breach their contracts with him. Downey v. United Weather-
proofing Co., 363 Mo. 852, 253 S.W.2d 976 (1953). In view of this holding earlier cases
holding that Fox's Libel Act was a bar to an injunction against slander of tide, Flint v.
Hutchinson Smoke Burner Co., 110 Mo. 492, 19 S.W. 804 (1892), or against an illegal
boycott, Marx & Hass Jeans Clothing Co. v. Watson, 168 Mo. 133, 67 S.W. 391 (1902), can
be deemed overruled.
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serious dispute as to whether the publication constituted a libel. This
was also the practice of many judges as to the issue of truth.5 ' He points
out that the injunction should only be granted when it is clear that the
publication is libelous and when it is clear that it is untrue. In such a
situation he observes that the jury trial is a "mere form" and "is no
more an obstacle than in the case of equity jurisdiction to enjoin tres-
pass, disturbance of easements or nuisance." 52 In other words, the evil
sought to be remedied by Fox's Libel Act is not present when there is
no disputed question of fact on which the jury should pass. I would
agree that the injunction should never be issued absent clear evidence
that the publication is libelous and untrue. In any event, if the state
constitution is interpreted as requiring a jury trial, the court can sum-
mon a jury to pass on these questions. Since we are no longer concerned
with questions of "equity jurisdiction," the fact that the plaintiff seeks
injunctive relief would not prevent the court's summoning a jury in a
proper case.58 Therefore, Fox's Libel Act should have no effect on the
power of a court to grant injunctive relief against defamation.
Let us now review the circumstances in which the courts will enjoin
publication. The cases fall into two classes, those involving "verbal
acts" and those involving disparagement of property.54 As to "verbal
acts" often the publication will not even be defamatory or untrue. One
situation is the employment of an illegal boycott where the defendant
publishes statements that the public should not use the plaintiff's prod-
uct.5 5 Another involves attempts to induce breaches of contracts that
third parties have with the plaintiff.56 In Downey v. United Weather-
proofing Co.,57 it was contended before the Missouri Supreme Court,
that an injunction could not be issued against such conduct. Some of
the statements were admittedly defamatory. The court observed that
mere loss of business due to defamatory statements about the plaintiff
would not be sufficient to justify an injunction. The court went on to
say that the constitutional provisions relating to the jury trial guarantee
prevented the granting of injunctive relief unless some ground other
than defamation would make the defendant's conduct wrongful. Here
the court found that the plaintiff was trying to prevent interference
with his business and contractual interests. Thus, the defendant was
committing another wrong by verbal means, which would be enjoined.
The distinction seems specious. In either event publication is being'
restrained. The inhibiting effect on expression is analytically the same
51. See the discussion in Pound, supra note 10, at 655-57.
52. ld. at 657.
53. Even in ancient equity the chancellor had a power to call an advisory jury.
54. Our use of the word, "disparagement," includes both slander of title (the claim
that the plaintiff does not have legal title to the property he is representing as his) and
trade libel (the claim that the plaintiff's product is not of the quality he represents).
55. See, e.g., Gompers v. Bucks Stove and Range Co., supra note 41. The Court found
that a union was subject to the provisions of the Sherman Act, which interpretation was
superseded by the Clayton Act.
56. Often the defendant is a business competitor, but this is not a requisite to the tort.
57. Supra note50.
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irrespective of the nature of the injury to the plaintiff. What the court
must be concluding is that the interest in personal reputation is not
entitled to injunctive protection while the interest in carrying on one's
business and contractual activities is. If this is the basis of the court's
decision and represents its evaluation of competing interests, that is one
thing. But it is difficult to see how the question can be resolved in
terms of the applicability of the constitutional guarantee.
Another type of verbal act that is enjoined is one involving unfair
competition. False statements about a competitor's product so that the
defendant can sell his own are enjoined."" So too are false statements
about the plaintiff's operation designed to drive him out of business and
give the defendant an illegal monopoly.6 9 And in the picketing area
injunctions have been granted against picketing-which admittedly
involves more than expression 6°--designed to induce businessmen to
unlawfully breach contracts,." designed to cause an employer to hire on
the basis of race, an illegal practice under state law, 62 and to commit an
unfair labor practice.63 And in Magill Bros. v. B'ldg Service Employees
Int'l Union,64 the court enjoined the pickets from the use of false and
defamatory statements in their picketing. The court found that untruth-
ful picketing was unlawful picketing. Observing that picketing involves
more than expression, the court concluded it was not enjoining the
utterance of false statements, but unlawful picketing.
Without necessarily approving of the results in all of these cases, 65 it
is contended that these cases recognize the power of the court to enjoin
publication consistent with the constitutional guarantees and the com-
mon law policy favoring free expression.6" Even though the expression
may be characterized as "verbal acts" and involves a tort other than
defamation, the inhibiting effect on expression is the same. In an effort
to avoid the rule, "Equity will not enjoin a libel," the courts have
found the acts wrongful on other grounds. But the expression has,
nonetheless, been enjoined, even in some instances where truthful, if it
was found to be for an improper purpose. Again, the results are justi-
fiable only if it is concluded that the interests involved in these cases
are entitled to protection while personal reputation is not.
Nor have most courts hesitated to enjoin disparagement of property,
even when no other tort such as unfair competition is present. Dissatis-
58. Black & Yates v. Mahogany Association, 129 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1941); Bourjois, Inc. v.
Park Drug Co., 82 F.2d 468 (8th Cir. 1936).
59. Burke Trust Co. v. Queen City Coach Co., 228 N.C. 768, 47 S.E.2d 297 (1948).
60. People may well refuse to cross a picket line without considering the merits of the
dispute.
61. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., supra note 42.
62. Hughes v. Superior Court, supra note 42.
63. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc., supra note 42.
64. 20 Cal. 2d 506, 127 P.2d 542 (1942).
65. See particularly the criticism of the Magill case, infra notes 96-100 and accompany-
ing text.
66. See also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), where "fighting words,"
e.g., "God damned racketeer," were held not to be within the protection of the first
amendment.
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fled buyers of automobiles have been enjoined from "driving the auto-
mobile covered with signs saying it was "no good," tying lemons and
other articles to it, placing a sign in the window that it had been
bought from the plaintiff and exhibiting it in front of the seller's place
of business," 67 and from placing a "white elephant" sign on the vehi-
cle.68 The Texas courts, however, have refused to enjoin this type of
conduct, saying that the expression is protected by the constitutional
guarantee;6 9 and an older Missouri case refused to enjoin slander of
title to the plaintiff's patent. 70 The authority of this case is doubtful in
view of the holding in Downey, particularly since the court stated there
that it was immaterial that unfair competition was involved. A later
case from the same jurisdiction in an intermediate appellate court held
that a former employee could be enjoined from contacting the plain-
tiff's customers, telling them that the plaintiff overcharged and that the
work was of inferior quality.71 This was held to be an interference with
his business and contractual relationships, rendering the constitutional
guarantee inapplicable.
An interesting case of disparagement was Lawrence Trust Co. v. Sun-
American Pub. Co.,7 2 where the defendant published an article about
the trust company stating that it was run by incompetent officials. The
allegation was that the article was defamatory and calculated to per-
suade the public not to patronize the plaintiff's business. The court held
that the attacks on the abilities and characters of the officers reflected
on the quality of the business and thus could be enjoined.78 But where
the individual had only his services to sell, attacks on him have not
been enjoined. Defamatory attacks on attorneys74 and physicians75 have
been held not subject to the injunctive process, since only personal
reputation was involved.
Again, where the court enjoins disparagement, it is enjoining expres-
sion. Since it is now recognized that injunctive relief is available to
protect personal rights as well as property rights, 76 the injunctions
67. Menard v. Houle, 298 Mass. 546, 11 N.E.2d 436 (1937).
68. Carter v. Knapp Motor Co., 243 Ala. 600, 11 So. 2d 383 (1943). See also Saxon Motor
Sales v. Torino, 166 Misc. 863, 2 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1938).
69. Lawrence v. Atwood, 295 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956); McMorries v. Hudson
Sales Corp., 233 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
70. Flint v. Hutchinson Smoke Burner Co., supra note 50.
71. May Furnace Co. v. Conaway, 352 S.W.2d 40 (Mo. App. 1961). See also the discus-
sion in note 50 supra.
72. 245 Mass. 262, 139 N.E. 655 (1923).
73. A contrary approach was taketn by the English court in Prudential Assurance Co. v.
Knott, supra note 9, where a pamphlet charged that the plaintiff's insurance company
was poorly run. The court held that "equity had no jurisdiction to restrain the publica-
tion of a libel." This is not the approach taken in England today. See the discussion in
note 9 supra. Now the test is simply whether damages and other remedies are inadequate
and whether the granting of specific relief will be practicable or will run counter to
other strong policies.
74. Gariepy v. Springer, 318 I1. App. 523, 48 N.E.2d 572 (1943); Kwass v. Kersey. 139
W. Va. 497, 81 S.E.2d 237 (1954). See the discussion, infra notes 104-06 and accompanying
text.
75. Wolf v. Harris, 267 Mo. 405, 184 S.W. 1139 (1916). See the discussion, infra notes
104-06 and accompanying text.
76. It is impossible to draw the distinction between personal and property interests
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should be granted against defamation to the same extent that they
are granted against disparagement and verbal acts. The hesitation that
the court may feel about granting an injunction against defamation-
the fear that there will be too great a restraint on expression if injunc-
tions are granted against personal expression-is unwarranted, as this
restraint can be avoided by following the practice that is now apparently
followed in the disparagement cases. The court is not required to
enjoin every act of personal defamation just as it does not enjoin every
act of disparagement. The principle is well established that the court
will not enjoin a disparagement when it is not in the public interest
to do so. In other words, the defense of public interest is available to
justify the refusal of an injunction against disparagement just as it is
in the case of all injunctive relief."
The leading case demonstrating this point is Krebiozen Research
Foundation v. Beacon Press.78 The plaintiffs were a non-profit corpo-
ration which sponsored cancer research, a doctor and medical school
instructor who was the scientific advisor of the foundation, the inventor
of the drug, and a drug company owning the manufacturing rights to
the drug. They had developed a drug, Krebiozen, which they contended
might be a cure for cancer. It was still in the experimental stage. The
defendant was a book publisher, who according to the complaint was
about to publish a book containing "false, fraudulent, wrongful, mali-
cious and erroneous statements which tend to destroy the good name
and professional reputation of the plaintiffs and the commercial value
of the drug, Krebiozen." The court assumed that this constituted dis-
paragement and based on previous cases concluded that it had the
power to issue an injunction against publication.
But it held that the power would not be exercised in this case, because
the public interest in the discussion of the subject of cancer and the
constitutional protection of a free press were entitled to greater protec-
tion than the plaintiff's interest in the commercial value of the drug. It
concluded that both the common law policy in favor of free expression
-here, the public interest in the discussion of cancer cures-and the
constitutional guarantee of free expression precluded the granting of
an injunction. It stated as follows:
The establishment of the truth about Krebiozen as soon as possible
is critically important to the public. If it is a cure it will be one of the
great discoveries of modern times; if it is of value in some cases only
the limitations are important; if it is of no value lives may be saved and
suffering avoided by the establishment of the fact. . . . It is axiomatic
in our society that full information and free discussion are important in
where one's professional reputation is involved. As the prevalence of character and fitness
committees indicate, undesirable personal qualities may render it impossible for a
person to practice his desired profession.
77. The concept of public interest is present throughout the area of specific relief. This
is particularly so as regards the refusal of injunctions against nuisances upon a balancing
of the relative hardships.
78. 334 Mass. 86, 134 N.E.2d 1, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 848 (1956).
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the search for wise decisions and best courses of action. In a particular
case, to be sure, new discovery may be impeded by a false and unjust
attack. . . . We grant that it could conceivably be here, as claimed,
that this attack which the demurrer admits for present purposes to be
false and defamatory will impede progress in the testing of Krebiozen.
But basing a rule on that possibility would end or at least effectively
emasculate discussion in the very controversial fields where it is most
important.79
The approach taken by the court is sound and demonstrates proper
regard for both the interests in property and reputation and the greater
and more important societal interest in free expression. An injunction
against the discussion of a matter of such public concern would clearly
be unconstitutional and in violation of our policy of free expression.
But every case does not involve matters of such public concern. We
recognize that the public interest in hearing that X Co.'s automobile
is a "lemon" is entitled to less weight than X Co.'s right to carry on its
business unhampered by untrue statements about the quality of its
products. So too, can it be said that the public's interest in hearing
about, say, the private life of an individual who is not a public figure,
is entitled to more weight than that individual's right to carry on his
life's activities unhampered by untrue statements about his character?
The emphasis should not be on the defendant's right to publish, but
on society's right to know. The defendant's right to publish for his own
satisfaction is entitled to no greater protection than the plaintiff's right
to a good reputation. We recognize this principle by allowing actions
for damages when the defendant has committed defamation. We pro-
tect the public's right to know by denying injunctive relief and per-
mitting the publication to be made. The rationale fails, however, when
the public interest in hearing what the defendant has to say is slight.
Does the public have a real interest in hearing purely private defama-
tion? We say that it does not when there is disparagement of ordinary
property. But when the property is a cancer cure as in Krebiozen, or
patent medicine that the defendant is attempting to expose as a worth-
less nostrum, as in Willis v. O'Connell,"0 the court immediately recog-
nizes the paramountcy of the public interest in free discussion. The
court need not fear that it must enjoin all personal defamation if it
enjoins some any more than it must enjoin the discussion of cancer
research if it enjoins placing "lemon" signs on an automobile.
Consider a case such as Kivett v. Nivels,si where the allegation was
that the defendant was exhibiting a forged letter in which plaintiff was
to have admitted having illicit sexual relations with a fifteen-year-old
girl. Plaintiff was not a public figure, and the public interest in his
79. 134 N.E.2d at 7.
80. 231 Fed. 1004 (S.D. Ala. 1916). See also Marlin Firearms Co. v. Shields, 171 N.W.
384, 64 N.E. 163 (1902), where the court concluded that the public interest in hearing
about the quality of rifles from a magazine specializing in reporting about them out-
weighed the interest of the manufacturer in preserving the reputation of his rifles.
81. 190 Tenn. 12, 227 S.W.2d 39 (1950).
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sexual relations was certainly no more than its interest in whether
a car was a "lemon." The court's granting an injunction to protect
the plaintiff's personal reputation in that case, as it protected the auto-
mobile's commercial reputation in the other cases, would not mean
that it would have to issue an injunction in a case such as Howell v.
Bee Publishing Co., s2 where the public interest in hearing what the
defendant had to say, even if defamatory and untrue, clearly out-
weighed the plaintiff's interest in his good reputation. There the
plaintiff was a candidate for governor of the state. The defendant
newspaper allegedly published false statements about him. The court
very properly held that it would be unconstitutional to enjoin such
publications. The public must hear all information about candidates
for public office. Since this is so, the court cannot take the risk that
it is wrong in finding the publication defamatory, with the result
that the public will be deprived of information it can consider in
deciding which candidate it will support.8 3 The court observed that
it would not enjoin the publishing of "political matter." The enjoining
of personal matter is on an entirely different footing.
All that is suggested is that the test for injunctions against personal
defamation be the same as that for injunctions against disparagement
of property. Where the public interest in hearing the communication
is outweighed by the plaintiff's interest in preserving the integrity of
his reputation, the court should enjoin the publication of defama-
tory and untrue statements. It is the public interest in hearing the
communication rather than the defendant's interest in expressing
it that must be considered. It should be noted that all the privileges
to the publishing of defamation, absolute and conditional, are still
applicable. It is only when the communication is defamatory, untrue,
unprivileged and of no real interest to the public that an injunction
would be proper. There will be no real inhibition on the process of
free discussion. As the Restatement has observed, "The public interest
in freedom of speech is degraded when it is used as a shield for tortious
harms caused by statements of a wholly private significance." 84 Enjoin-
ing of personal libels in England85 has not had any adverse effect on
expression; nor has the enjoining of disparagement in this country once
it is recognized that an injunction will be refused when the public
interest in hearing the communication outweighs the plaintiff's interest
82. 100 Neb. 39, 158 N.W. 358 (1916).
83. In the 1962 elections the lower courts in California issued a spate of injunctions
against the dissemination of certain campaign literature allegedly defamatory. See New
York Times, October 31, 1962, p. 1. Naturally there was no time for appeal. The actions
of these courts were most improper and deprived the public of an opportunity to have
information about the candidates. The holdings were clearly erroneous and would have
been reversed by the appellate courts.
84. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 942, comment d (1939). The Restatement takes the position
taken here, that the policy favoring free expression is to promote the discussion of matters
of public interest and does not come into play when matters of purely private significance
are involved. It notes that the frontiers of public interest are constantly expanding and
admonishes against the too frequent issuance of injunctions against writing.
85. See the discussion of the English practice in Pound, supra note 10, at 665-66.
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in preserving the commercial reputation of his property. So too, enjoin-
ing personal defamation will have no adverse effect, since the only
instances in which the injunction will be granted are those where the
public interest in hearing the subject matter of the communication is
not involved.
Our concept of free expression recognizes that there are varying
qualities to such expression. Obscenity-as defined by the Supreme
Court and not as erroneously applied by many state and lower federal
courts-is deemed to have no social utility, 6 nor are "fighting words," s7
nor race libel."" Handbills of a commercial nature are not entitled to
the same protection as those disseminating religious ideas. Thus, the
state can apply its anti-littering laws to the former, 9 but not to the lat-
ter.90 The public's interest in knowing where certain goods can be
bought is outweighed by the government's in maintaining clean streets;
but its interest in hearing about religious views is not. This is not to be
taken as approval of the "balancing process" when applied to justify
governmental action restricting the spread of political ideas and actions.
Here the author is in accord with the absolutist view. But where per-
sonal defamation of individuals whose affairs are not a matter of public
concern is involved, it is submitted that a balancing of the public inter-
est in hearing the expression against the individual's interest in preserv-
ing his reputation is proper. The court should protect a man's personal
reputation no less than it protects the reputation of the products he
sells. The court's hesitancy to issue injunctions against personal defama-
tion, it is felt, arises out of a fear of inhibiting public discussion. This
fear should not prevent the granting of an injunction where the subject
matter of the communication is not one for public discussion and
involves matters in which the public has no interest.
Applying this test to the decided cases, I would conclude that the
great majority of them were rightly decided. In these cases the granting
of an injunction would have been improper and in some at least, uncon-
stitutional because of the public interest in free discussion. What is
objectionable are those cases where the courts blindly denied injunc-
tive relief on the ground that personal reputation was involved, with-
out considering whether there was any public interest in hearing the
communication, or such slight interest that it is clearly outweighed by
the plaintiff's interest in preserving his good reputation.
As stated previously, where the plaintiff was a candidate for public
office, the injunction was properly denied. 91 The public interest in
knowing of his qualifications and defects outweighs any interest of his
in preserving his reputation. Drawing an analogy to invasion of privacy,
86. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
87. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, supra note 66. See also Fox v. State of Washington,
236 U.S. 273 (1915), involving advocacy of violation of law.
88. --Beauharnais v. Illinois, supra note 46.
89. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
90. Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943).
91. See the discussion, supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
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we may say that public personages should not have their reputations
protected by injunctions. The public interest in knowing about the
activities of these persons justifies the risk of injury to their reputa-
tions. Any injury to these reputations can only be compensated by
damages, since by employing that method the public may receive the
communication. This rationale justifies the result in a case such as
Kuhn v. Warner Bros.9 2 The defendant was issuing a movie, "Confes-
sions of a Nazi Spy," which dealt with the activities of the German-
American Bund and its president. The public had a strong interest in
knowing about these activities because of the effect their actions could
have on American foreign and domestic policy. This justifies any injury
to reputation that would result from a defamatory publication.
The public interest in learning the facts of a labor dispute has been
properly held to justify the refusal of an injunction against allegedly
untruthful statements by one of the parties. In Montgomery Ward v.
United Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Employees of Amer-
ica,93 the employer sought to restrain the union from publishing in
their booklets "untrue, libelous and defamatory statements." The
court held that the injunction could not be constitutionally issued. It
observed that only in the case of trade libel or wrongful coercion would
an injunction be issued. Much of the opinion was devoted to demon-
strating why the acts of the defendants were not trade libel, and the
analysis of the basic question is sketchy. But the result is sound. In a
labor dispute both sides are appealing to the public for support. With
the recent tendency of governmental officials to intervene in an attempt
to mediate, public support for a position becomes highly significant.
Also, the union must persuade its members and to an extent, other
unions of the soundness of its position if the strike is to have adequate
support. Therefore, the interest of the public and the recipients of the
communications clearly outweigh the plaintiff's interest in preserving
its reputation.
In Ex parte Tucker,94 the court held unconstitutional an injunction
against the union and its members prohibiting them from defaming
any employees of the company during a strike. The same considera-
tions which justify the risk to the employer's reputation justify that
to the reputations of his non-striking employees. The facts of the labor
dispute must be brought into the open even at the risk of injury
to reputation.9 5 With this in mind the result in Magill Bros. v. B'ldg
Service Employees Int'l Union,96 is very questionable. There the court
92. 29 F. Supp. 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
93. 400 111. 38, 79 N.E.2d 46 (1948).
94. 110 Tex. 335, 220 S.W. 75 (1920). See also Venturelli v. Trovery, 346 Ill. App. 429,
105 N.E.2d 306 (1952), where the court refused to enjoin the union from listing the
plaintiff's name in the "we do not patronize" section of its newspaper.
95. The same position was taken by the court in Moore v. City Dry Cleaners, 41 So. 2d
865 (Fla. 1949), where it enjoined a union from acts of violence in connection with a
strike, but did not enjoin it from "advertising the strike," at the plaintiff's place of
business.
96. Supra note 64.
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enjoined pickets from the use of false or untruthful statements in
their picketing. The court said that picketing is more than ordinary
expression and that untruthful picketing was unlawful picketing. Since
that portion of the picketing was unlawful, it could be enjoined. It
concluded that the effect of the decree would be to protect the legiti-
mate interests of both parties.
This neat syllogism overlooks the fact that the court is acting as
censor over a matter in which it admits the public has a strong interest.
The court is deciding that the matter is untrue instead of leaving this
to be determined "in the arena of public opinion." The result is even
more questionable, since the same court refused to enjoin personal
defamation in a case where -the public interest in the matter was
doubtful.97 And in a subsequent case where it issued an injunction
against all picketing, it refused to enjoin efforts by the union to
persuade other unions to refuse to handle the plaintiff's goods.98
The court's obsession with picketing as something other than speech
caused it to fall into the situation where it and not the public is
the judge of the truth of a matter of public interest. While the result
may be constitutional in view of the Supreme Court's attitude toward
picketing,99 nonetheless, it is undesirable. Where the public has an
interest in the subject matter of the communication, the court should
not decide what the public may hear, even though it finds that what
the defendant is saying is untruthful.100
Another situation in which the interest of a substantial number of
persons in hearing what the defendant had to say justified the refusal
of an injunction against defamation occurred in Rosicrucian Fellow-
ship v. Rosicrucian Fellowship Non-Sectarian Church. 10' This involved
a dispute between two factions each claiming to be entitled to the
property of the religious organization. The court decided which group
was the dominant one and hence, entitled to the property. But it
refused to enjoin the dissatisfied members from issuing slanderous
or libelous statements against the others. Such an injunction would
be an infringement upon free expression. The court emphasized
that a religious controversy was present. All members of the group
had an interest in hearing statements about the leaders and members
97. See the discussion of the Bailey case, infra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
98. N.W. Pac. R. Co. v. Lumber & Sawmill Workers Association, 31 Cal. 2d 441, 189
P.2d 277 (1948). The court enjoined violent picketing and the threatening of workers who
did not go out on strike. But the injunction was modified so as not to prohibit peaceful
persuasion. The emphasis was on the prior restraint involved.
99. It may be safely stated that only peaceful picketing for a purpose considered proper
under state law may not be enjoined. The approach that untruthful picketing is unlaw-
ful may not commend itself to the Supreme Court, but this cannot be ascertained
definitely in view of the Court's changed attitude toward picketing since Thornhill.
100. Compare the holding in Milwaukee Electric Railway & Light Co. v. Pallange, 205
Wis. 126, 236 N.W. 549 (1931), where the court refused to enjoin a newspaper from
urging streetcar passengers not to pay higher fares, on the ground that the higher fare
was illegal. It also urged the passengers to defy the motorman to eject them. The plain-
tiff alleged that violence would result, but the court held that the public interest in
making its protest known was paramount.
101. 39 Cal. 2d 121, 245 P.2d 494 (1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 938 (1953).
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of the victorious group. The number of persons that would have an
interest in the communication made the matter one of "public
interest" justifying the refusal of the injunction. As far as the members
of the religion were concerned the plaintiffs were "public figures,"
and free discussion of their qualifications and characters could not
be restrained.
A similar case is Choate v. Logan.02 There a commander of an
American Legion post sought to restrain publication by the executive
committee of a report censuring the plaintiff for a speech he made
about the Legion. The injunction was denied, the court holding that
the committee had a right to make a report on the conduct of the
officers and members. The other members of the organization are
interested in the conduct of their officers, and they should determine
the truth or falsity of the statements rather than the courts. As dis-
cussed previously, the refusal of the injunction in the majority of the
cases where it has been sought is sound and necessary to prevent the
inhibition of free expression.
Our concern is with those cases where it is not. The clearest case
in this category is Kivett v. Nivels,1°3 which we have discussed pre-
viously. Here an individual alleged that he was being libelled by a
forged letter in which he is to have admitted illicit sexual relations.
No substantial segment of the public could legitimately be interested
in his sexual activities. Note that there could be no question of
enjoining the defendants from taking this to the police; there would
be a qualified privilege to report matters such as this to law enforce-
ment officers. But the plaintiff is entitled to have his reputation
protected from attacks such as this that do not involve the public
interest. The societal loss if the court errs in its determination as to
the truth or accuracy of the statement is nil, as there is no public
interest in the subject matter of the communication. Consequently, an
injunction should have been issued here. The granting of it is no
different than an injunction against the placing of the proverbial
"lemon" on the automobile.
The next situation involves a clearer parallel to the disparagement
cases. In some of those cases dissatisfied customers disparaged the
quality of the plaintiff's merchandise. The majority of the courts
before whom the question has come have enjoined such conduct.
They have concluded that the public interest in hearing about the
merchandise from a dissatisfied customer is not such that the publica-
tion should be permitted at the risk of injury to the product's reputa-
tion. The danger to free expression if the matter not published is
true is deemed outweighed by the danger of injury to the product's
102. 240 Mass. 131, 133 N.E. 582 (1921).
103. Supra note 81. There the plaintiff brought a "bill quiat timet" in order to get
around the rule that "equity would not enjoin a libel." The procedural result is correct.
since whether a court will grant specific relief should not depend on the label the plaintiff
assigns to the form of specific relief he seeks.
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reputation if the matter is published and is false, which the court
finds it is. However, when the plaintiff does not sell a product, but
sells himself, the courts have not extended this protection. In Kwass
v. Kersey, 0 4 the plaintiff was an attorney who had drawn up a
divorce settlement. The wife later became dissatisfied with the agree-
ment, and her father circulated letters among friends and clients of
the plaintiff accusing him of being a "shyster" and otherwise guilty of
improper practices. The court refused to grant an injunction, em-
phasizing that no "property right" was involved. Even if the require-
ment of a property right would be imposed, it may be asked what
other "property right" a lawyer can have than his reputation for
ability and integrity. Whether the conduct of the defendant constitutes
disparagement or defamation is immaterial. If the defendant has a com-
plaint with the attorney, he can take it to the grievance committee of
the bar association or a similar tribunal. His position is no different
than that of the dissatisfied buyers in the automobile cases. Nor did
the court indicate that the public has any "special interest" in hearing
about an attorney; it merely failed to find a "property right" and
automatically refused relief.
Of like import is Gariepy v. Springer.10 5 There the dissatisfied client
sent out circulars stating that the attorney was engaged in practice
with a dishonest partner and that he had "wrecked the defendant's
family." The plaintiff alleged that he had to answer the charges to
people who kept asking him about it. The court held that it would
not enjoin a libel even if it injured the individual's business reputa-
tion. That the court was not concerned about inhibiting expression
is demonstrated by its observation that if the plaintiff could show that
the defendant was attempting extortion, it would grant the injunction.
In Wolf v. Harris,06 the court refused to enjoin the defendant from
alleging that the plaintiff physician committed malpractice resulting
in the death of the defendant's daughter. There was evidence of
extortion. The basis of the decision was Fox's Libel Act, as discussed
previously, which prevented the issuance of an injunction. It said that
if the plaintiff first obtained a judgment for damages or had joined a
claim for damages, once the jury had found in his favor, an injunction
against future publication would be ordered. Even assuming the
analysis of Fox's Libel Act to be sound, it is difficult to see why the
court did not call in a jury to determine the libelous and untruthful
character of the publication.
In all of these cases an injunction should have been granted. The
public interest in hearing about the activities of these persons is
slight. If they have acted improperly, their conduct can be reported
to the proper professional authorities. The injury to their reputations
104. Sutra note 74.
105. Ibid.
100. Supra note 75.
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can be extensive. The defendant will have the opportunity to assert
the defenses of truth and the like before the court. The only danger
is that the court will err and the public be deprived of some informa-
tion. Since the matter is not of great public interest-anymore so than the
quality of property-and the injury to reputation can be severe, the
court should take the risk of error and issue the injunction.
The situation where the refusal of the injunction becomes more
acute is where other interests than reputation are injured by the
publication such as the right to a fair trial. In Bailey v. Superior
Court,10 7 the plaintiff was a criminal defendant charged with murder.
Prior to the trial the defendant advertised that he would produce a
play. The play was alleged to be based on the facts concerning the
case for which the plaintiff was being tried, and the plaintiff com-
plained that the publication of it would identify him and prevent
his receiving a fair trial. The court held that the injunction could
not constitutionally be issued, since the court cannot act as a censor.
Here the public interest in hearing about the matter would conflict
with the right of the plaintiff to have a fair trial. In this country, un-
like England, we permit "trial in the newspapers."' 08 Assuming that
the guarantee of free expression prohibits the courts from enjoining
reporting of the facts of the case, a decent compromise would give
the criminal defendant the right to insist that the facts are not untrue
or embellished. The public can get all the facts after the triall More-
over, some of them will be acting as jurors-potentially they all are-
which imposes a limitation on their right to receive the expression.
Therefore, it is submitted that an injunction should be issued in such
a case.
Another situation where the injunction should have been issued
without any reference to the question of constitutionality is Ryan v.
City of Warrensburg.09 The defendants were municipal officers who,
it was alleged, were spreading untrue statements about the plaintiff in
an effort to make him cease conducting his barbershop in connection
with his residence, which was illegal. The court held that an injunc-
tion against the issuance of libelous statements would be unconstitu-
tional. 10 The answer is that municipal officials do not have the right
to harass citizens by libel or otherwise if they are violating the law.
In such a case they should resort to criminal prosecution or other
remedies to insure compliance. The injunction should have been
granted against improper acts by municipal officials irrespective of
whether those acts involved expression.
In summary, there should be no question as to the power of the
107. 112 Cal. 94, 44 Pac. 458 (1896).
108. For an excellent discussion of the impact of newspaper publicity upon the trial of
a case see Lofton, Justice and the Press-Communication Inside and Outside the Court-
room, 6 ST. Louis U.L.J. 449 (1961).
109. 342 Mo. 761, 117 S.W.2d 303 (1938).
110. This was on the basis of Fox's Libel Act.
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court to enjoin expression when the injury is to personal reputation
any more so than when the injury is to the reputation of a product
or the expression involves "verbal acts." In each instance there is
the same inhibiting effect on expression. Where the public interest in
hearing such expression is slight and hence, outweighed by the injury
to reputation that can result from the dissemination of such expression,
injunctive relief should be granted.
THE RIGHT To BE LET ALONE
Bodily and Personal Security
Here the invasion may come about in basically one of two ways,
physical assault or harassment. Individual assaults have not been
enjoined. In Ashinsky v. Levenson,"' the defendant had been dis-
rupting religious services and had been molesting the spiritual leader.
The court enjoined him from entering the synagogue-repeated tres-
passes to land 2-but refused to enjoin him from accosting or molest-
ing the spiritual leader. The court said that there was "an adequate
remedy at law." In Kostoff v. Harris,"8 the court refused to enjoin
the defendant from injuring the plaintiff with whom he had previously
engaged in an altercation, saying that damages and criminal prose-
cution were adequate remedies.
The courts cannot mean that damages are "adequate" as the term
has traditionally been understood. No amount of money can com-
pensate for the pain and suffering and the physical injuries that
result from an assault. And the mere fact that the act constitutes a
crime does not prevent injunctive relief if other remedies are not
adequate. So too, ordinarily an individual cannot institute criminal
prosecutions unless the state approves. The result, however, is correct,
since an injunction would have no effect. A party intending to com-
mit an assault is no more deterred by the issuance of an injunction
than he is by the threat of an action of damages or arrest and criminal
prosecution."14 We are dealing here with strong personal feelings
that the law cannot affect. The only result of the issuance of such
a decree would be that the defendant would be punished by contempt
rather than by criminal prosecution or by punitive damages in a civil
action. The injunctive process will be of no avail in such a situation,
and it is submitted that the issuance of an ineffective injunction
merely breeds disrespect for the legal processes.
On the other hand, no personal feelings were present in a case
111. 250 Pa. 14, 100 Atl. 491 (1917).
112. Damages are an inadequate remedy there because of the need for a multiplicity of
suits.
115. 266 S.W.2d 204 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
114. It has been said that if there is time to apply for an injunction, there is time to
apply for police protection. de Funiak, supra note 11, at 11-12. However, the availability of
police protection would not necessarily mean that "other remedies were adequate." For
example, one can also call the police to eject a trespasser.
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such as Crew v. W. T. Smith Lumber Co."15 There the defendant
claimed title to the land on which the plaintiff was conducting timber
cutting operations and threatened violence against the plaintiff's
employees and contractors to prevent their cutting the timber. The
court refused to grant the injunction, since "equity would not enjoin
a personal trespass." This is unsound. Even assuming that damages
would be adequate for interference with the plaintiff's economic in-
terest, 116 they would not be for any physical injury caused to these
persons. There is no evidence of personal malice as to them, so thedeterrent effect of an injunction is more likely to be effective here.
The defendant is merely being enjoined from employing unlawful
means to accomplish an objective.117 The effect of the injunction is
to prohibit those means and to tell him that he must resort to the
legal processes to oust the plaintiff. The absence of personal feelings
distinguishes this from the other assault cases and an injunction can
be effective. Since damages would not be adequate for any personal
injury that might result, an injunction should be granted.118
So too, can injunctions be effective against collective assaults. In
United States v. Marine Engineers Beneficial Ass'n,1 9 the court
refused to enjoin the defendants from threatening to attack 'non-
union seamen. Suit was brought by the United States in a non-
governmental capacity to protect its interest in the docks. The court
indicated that an injunction to prevent interference with the opera-
tion of the docks would be proper, but that it could not "enjoin an
assault." This is most unsound. The injunction, like any order in alabor dispute, would be effective against the union leaders. Even
though there might be hostility against non-union seamen, it must
be assumed that the union leaders are sufficiently responsible so that
they will obey the injunction-at least they are no less likely to do
so than any other defendant. Later cases have recognized the distinc-
tion between enjoining individual assaults and collective violence by
organized groups, and unions have been enjoined from permitting
violent picketing by its members and from preventing other employees
from working.120 It is not accurate then to say that an assault will
not be enjoined. Rather it should be that personal assaults will not be
enjoined where the injunctive process is likely to be ineffective, but
115. 268 Ala. 628, 109 So. 2d 721 (1959).
"116. This is doubtful. Even though lost profits may be recoverable, they are not
considered an adequate remedy to justify the refusal of specific relief. For example, wherethe court finds an interference with commercial relations, injunctive relief is always
considered affirmatively proper.
117. Analogous to competition by unfair methods, which is enjoinable.118. The relationship between the plaintiff and his employees would be sufficient tojustify his asserting their rights. See International News Service v. The Associated Press,248 U.S. 215 (1918), where a news distributing agency was held to be entitled to injunctive
relief on the grounds that such relief was necessary to protect its subscribers.
119. 277 Fed. 830 (W.D. Wash. 1921).120. N.W. Pac. R. Co. v. Lumber & Sawmill Workers Association, supra note 98;Southern Bus Lines v. Amalgamated Association, 205 Miss. 354, 38 So. 2d 765 (1949).
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that in economic disputes or other instances of group activity, assaults
should be enjoined, since damages and other remedies are clearly
inadequate.
The same considerations may be present in a situation where the
defendant, by one method or another, is harassing the plaintiff. An
older case in which the court refused to issue an injunction is
Chappell v. Stewart,121 where the defendant caused private detectives
to "shadow" the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged that the conduct
"caused him great inconvenience and annoyance, interfered with his
social intercourse and business, and caused grave suspicions to be
entertained about him, so as to damage his financial credit." The
court gave two grounds for the decision: (1) damages were adequate;
and (2) "equity protected only property rights." Although a cause
of action for damages resulting from "shadowing" has been recog-
nized,' -2 the recovery of damages clearly would not be adequate, since
there is no way of measuring the injury to feelings, the annoyance,
and the possible injury to reputation that could result. In any case,
this involved a continuous course of conduct, so the need for a multi-
plicity of suits-a cause of action would presumably arise each time
the plaintiff was "shadowed"-would render the damages remedy
inadequate.
It has been suggested that the result is correct since the plaintiff
has suffered no "actionable wrong"; public policy, it is contended,
would prohibit recognizing the right of an individual to be immune
from properly conducted observations by detectives.1 23 There are two
answers to this viewpoint. The first is that the court assumed that a
substantive right had been violated. Secondly, it did not appear that
the defendant had any reason to observe the plaintiff.12 4 The author
cannot mean that a person must go through life under the observation
of detectives merely because another wishes to see what he is doing.
Substantively, there should be the right to be immune from such
observation unless the defendant can demonstrate justification for the
observation, e.g., the plaintiff is his spouse whom he has good reason
to suspect of infidelity. Injunctive relief is both necessary and prac-
ticable. We have demonstrated that damages would be inadequate
because of the personal feelings involved and the possible injury to
reputation with all the conceivable harm such injury might bring.
Violation of the injunction would not be difficult to prove, and the
intensity of feeling involved is not such as is present in the case of
a physical assault. An injunction should be issued here in the absence
of a showing of justification.
A slight annoyance will not be enjoined and should not be. In
121. 82 Md. 323, 33 Ad. 542 (1897).
122. See Schultz v. Frankfort Marine Insurance Co., 151 Wis. 537, 139 N.W. 386 (1913).
123. Long, supra note 11. at 125.
124. The case came up on demurrer, so there was no question of affirmative defenses
such as justification.
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Williams v. O'Shaughnessy,125 the complaint alleged that the plain-
tiff's former attorney was constantly sending her letters and excerpts
from the Bible. The court found that this was not done solely for
the purpose of annoying her and that no correspondence was sent after
she had requested that he stop, and refused the injunction. An injunc-
tion should not be granted here, even if the sole purpose was annoy-
ance, since all the plaintiff had to do was to throw away the unopened
letters. This is the type of case in which the plaintiff is trying to
employ the processes of the law for a purpose for which they were
never intended.
A similar situation was presented in Smith v. Hamm. 126 The parties
were neighbors who did not get along, and one set sought to enjoin
the other from cursing them, falsely accusing their daughter of mis-
conduct and directing threats against the plaintiffs. The injunction was
refused, the court noting that the plaintiff could commence a criminal
prosecution by filing a complaint.127 The real point is that the law
cannot be bothered with such matters; it cannot regulate through the
injunctive process the day to day relationships of people. Neighbors
will quarrel and harass one another. If any regulation is to take
place, it should be through criminal prosecutions for breach of the
peace. Otherwise, the parties must work things out themselves.
Nothing else could be accomplished if the court had to spend their
time making one neighbor leave the other alone. The injury is not
sufficiently serious that the matter should take up judicial time. So
too, continuous trespasses over the grass causing no injury and the
constant using of offensive and insulting language toward the plain-
tiff and his wife do not cause such injury that the court must take
cognizance of the problem. 128 Also, the plaintiff could possibly have
the defendant arrested if an ordinance prohibits cursing and the like.
In any event, the employment of the injunctive process is not necessary
because of the insufficiency of the injury.
But in a case such as Hawks v. Yancey, 29 there is more than mere
annoyance. The defendant is trying to make himself a part of the
plaintiff's life against her will andto prevent her from forming rela-
tionships with others. There the plaifitiff had previously engaged in
illicit relations with the defendant, but had broken off the affair. The
defendant constantly accosted her in public, begging her to take him
back, made statements about her and made false charges to the police
about her. She told him she was engaged to another man, and he was
125. 172 N.Y.S. 574 (Sup. Ct. 1918).
126. 207 Ark. 507, 181 S.W.2d 475 (1944).
127. Here also the plaintiff could commence a criminal prosecution by filing a
complaint before a magistrate. It apparently was not necessary that the prosecutor ap-
prove. On that basis the case was distinguished in Webber v. Gray, 228 Ark. 289, 307
S.W.2d 80 (1957). where the court enjoined harassment of a more serious nature. Still,
because of the nature of the harassment here, I doubt if the court would have granted an
injunction even in the absence of this authorization.
128. Randall v. Freed, 154 Cal. 299, 97 Pac. 669 (1908).
129. 265 S.W. 233 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
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trying to persuade her fianc6 not to marry her. The court enjoined
this conduct and directed him not to harass her by these actions.13 0
Clearly damages are not adequate to redress the personal injury in-
volved. She could call the police to prevent his bothering her in public,
but could not prevent the other conduct. The only question is the
practicability of issuing the injunction.
Here strong emotions are present. But the desire for a relationship
is unilateral; there is no question of two people acting in concert
to establish a relationship against the wishes of a third.13 A violation
can be easily shown. The interference is with a real and substantial
interest of the plaintiff. Injunctive relief is the only possible device by
which she can be protected from this unwanted intrusion in her life.
The court should issue the injunction in hopes of preventing the
violation, but if it is violated, then it can punish the defendant by
contempt proceedings. The risk of injury to the efficacy of the legal
process by the issuance of an injunction is outweighed by the necessity
of protecting this vital interest.
Moreover, there is a substantial possibility that the injunction will
be obeyed since violations can be easily detected. The defendant is
more likely to avoid violation when the other party to the relationship
he seeks to form is hostile to such formation than when she is willing.
The same reasoning justified the issuance of the injunction in
Webber v. Gray.132 The plaintiff had formerly had an affair with the
defendant and had had sexual relationships with her. He terminated
the relationship and subsequently got married. The defendant wrote
letters to the plaintiff, his wife, his mother and his employer in which
she stated that he was the father of her unborn child. She announced
that she had married the plaintiff and published this in the local
paper. She would daily accost him in the street, follow him to work
and leave notes in his car. The court enjoined all these activities. It
did not enjoin her driving near his home, which indeed, is too broad
a restraint.133 Again, this is more than slight annoyance. Here is a
complete intrusion into his life, making it unbearable. 3 4 Whether
the injunction will work is questionable. The defendant is obviously
in need of psychiatric help. Still it may. Again, violations are easy
to detect, and there is not the question of persons acting in concert
to preserve a relationship. Perhaps the injunction will be "shock
130. The court also held that because of the statute it was not necessary to find a
"property right."
131. Compare the cases involving affairs with third parties, infra notes 204-20 and
accompanying text.
132. Supra note 127.
133. The court also did not enjoin her instituting suit against him for breach of
contract to marry.
134. The court also held that the bar of unclean hands was inapplicable because of the
interest of the innocent wife. Cf. Nat'l Dress Manufacturers Association v. United Associa-
tion of Dress Manufacturers, 151 Misc. 827, 272, N.Y.S. 360 (1934), refusing to apply the
bar to avoid enforcement of a contract where such non-enforcement would result in
40,000 workers losing employment.
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therapy." In any event, it must be issued in the hope that the plaintiff
will have some chance of leading a normal life free of such harassment.
Hunt v. Hudgins,185 where an injunction was also granted, is a
closer case. The plaintiff had previously made the defendant pregnant,
and she had submitted to an abortion. He had settled with her for
a sum of money. Subsequently he married. The defendant made
threats to the plaintiff and his wife, cursed them whenever she saw
them and did "other acts to harass and molest them." The extent of
harassment was not nearly so great as in Webber v. Gray. The result
may be correct when the interest of the plaintiff's wife is considered.
The court emphasized that she was innocent and that the plaintiff had
"a right to maintain his home." While the harassment may not have
been of such magnitude as to make life completely intolerable, none-
theless, it could have an adverse effect on the marriage relationship
between plaintiff and his wife. Doubtless she was not overly pleased
about her husband's prior liaison and did not desire constant
reminders of it. She could escape this harassment by leaving him,
and the combination of the harassment and the unpleasant associa-
tion could seriously impair this marriage. Under these circumstances
the interest was sufficient to justify the injunction. In Blanton v.
Blanton,186 the plaintiff claimed he was not legally married to the
defendant and a suit for annulment was pending. The court enjoined
her from making money demands of him and accosting him at his
home or place of employment pending litigation. The temporary
nature of the restraint may justify the result, but it does not seem
that the interference was sufficiently great as to justify the issuance
of injunctive relief. Presumably she would cease this conduct if the
marriage was annulled. If it was not annulled, then she was doing
only what she had a right to do. If annulment were granted and the
conduct persisted, then perhaps the injunction would be proper.
In these harassment cases the question should be whether the degree
of interference is such that injunctive relief should be ordered. Where
the conduct of the defendant makes living intolerable or threatens to
disrupt a marriage, an injunction should be issued. The serious ad-
verse effect justifies running the risk the injunction will be violated,
since a violation can be detected easily enough. But for the ordinary
annoyances that result when people cannot get along, the judicial
processes should not be employed. There are too many serious
interests that need protection for the courts to spend their time trying
to make people leave others alone in everyday living.
Confidential Records and Letters
The privacy involved here enjoys a special distinction, since it
was the first personal interest to be protected under the guise that the
135. 168 S.W.2d 703 (rex. Civ. App. 1943).
136. 163 Ga. 361, 136 S.E. 141 (1926).
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court was protecting a property right.13 7 Consequently, there can be
no doubt that it will be protected today. In Gee v. Pritchard,188 the
plaintiff and her husband had taken the defendant in as a boy and
had raised him. The plaintiff had written him letters apparently of
a very "endearing" nature. They had had a dispute, and she showed
her disfavor of him publicly. He intended to publish those letters to
show her "true feelings" toward him. She brought suit to enjoin the
publication of the letters.
Lord Eldon, while causing inestimable harm to injunctive protec-
tion of personal interests by his statement that "equity protects only
property rights," found a property right present and in doing so pro-
tected the plaintiff's interest in having her personal sentiments kept
secret. He declared that the writer of a letter has a "property right
in the contents." This "property right" was inferior to the "special
property" right of the receiver. The only realistic part of the opinion
was the realization that the receiver has no license to publish the
contents of the letter to the public. This recognizes the substantive
right to privacy of the sender. Damages are obviously inadequate to
measure the injury to feelings by the disclosure of matters intended
to be kept confidential. There is no problem of enforcement, as the
defendant could be ordered to surrender the letter. In King v. King,39
Mary King wrote letters to Francis King while he was married to
Margaret King. Apparently Mary was the second Mrs. King. These
letters were obtained by Margaret King and used in her divorce action
against Francis. She now sought to get the letters back from the court.
The alleged purpose was to use the letters against Mary King in the
Eastern Star Lodge, apparently to oust her from membership. The
court enjoined Margaret from obtaining the letters and making them
public, applying the rule of Gee v. Pritchard. Again, these were per-
sonal letters no doubt expressing strong feelings of the plaintiff, and
she had the right to have these feelings kept from all but the recipient.
The concept of property right has served to prevent disclosure of
the letters after the sender was dead and his interest in privacy
ceases to exist. 140 In Baker v. Libbie,141 the plaintiff was the executor
under the will of Mary Baker Eddy, the founder of the Christian Science
Movement. She had sent some letters to the defendant dealing with
commonplace subjects and involving no personal sentiments or the
like. The defendant sought to publish these letters for commercial
purposes. The court enjoined their publication, stating that the
sender had a property right in the letters which passed to her estate.
Here not only was the sender dead and her feelings beyond the range
137. For a discussion of the historical significance of this see Pound, supra note 10.
138. Supra note 7.
139. 25 Wyo. 275, 168 Pac. 730 (1917).
140. Ordinarily the tort, as with defamation, would not survive the death of the plain-
tiff because of its intensely personal nature.
141. 210 Mass. 599, 97 N.E. 109 (1912).
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f injury, but the subject matter was such that even had she lived
there could be no injury to feelings by disclosure of private matters.
There was, thus, nothing here to injure the feelings of her descendants.
The court recognized what the issue really was and while following
precedent really achieved a sensible accommodation. Publication of
the letters for advertising or commercial purposes was enjoined, but
the defendant was permitted to sell the letters to autograph collectors,
which would enable him to reap substantial profit. The estate did not
want her letters published unless royalties were paid. This case in-
volved purely property matters and was treated as such. We must
distinguish between the situation where the publication of letters
involves personal feelings and where it involves commercial matters. 142
Though the result is the same in both instances, the underlying
rationale is entirely different. It is doubtful whether the woman's
descendants in a situation like Gee v. Pritchard could today enjoin
publication of personal letters unless privacy is deemed to extend
to the descendants. So too, it is doubtful whether an ordinary person
could enjoin the publication of commonplace letters, since there would
be no injury to feelings by such publication. Unless there is an eco-
nomic question, there is no reason to enjoin publication of letters
in the absence of real privacy's being involved, i.e., the publication
would reveal matters the writer would want to keep secret.
However, neither privacy nor the commercial interest in letters
will or should be protected when the public interest demands revela-
tion of the contents of the letter. In Barrett v. Fish,'1 4 the plaintiff
sought an injunction to restrain the prosecuting attorney from pro-
ducing letters written by the plaintiff to be used in a criminal pro-
ceeding against him. The plaintiff was being tried for adultery, and
the letters tended to prove criminal intimacy. Although recognizing
the plaintiff's "property right" in the letters, the court held that this
interest must yield to the public interest in the administration of justice
and refused the injunction. If the plaintiff had the letters, he could not
have been forced to produce them, since this would constitute self-
incrimination; but he could not prevent the defendant from using them.
The court went on to say that any individual may be required to pro-
duce letters written to him despite the interest of the sender and himself
unless to do so would violate his privilege against self-incrimination.
This exception was originally recognized by the court in Gee v. Prit-
chard as well. It is an example of the public interest as a defense to
injunctive relief.'"
142. The commercial nature of the interest is demonstrated by Folsom v. Marsh, 9
Fed. Cas. 342, No. 4901 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). The defendant published a work of Washing-
ton's letters that the plaintiff claimed infringed his copyright. The court held that there
was no right to publish the private letters of a person without his consent and since only
plaintiff had the consent, the injunction was granted. It was found that these particular
etters were not "public documents."
143. 47 At. 174, 72 Vt. 18 (1899).
144. As in Krebiozen, supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
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The personal privacy of letters should be protected against improper
disclosure by the recipient, unless the letters must be produced
to assist in the administration of justice or the public interest other-
wise demands their production. 145 Since the personal interest is what
is really involved, protection should not extend to commonplace
letters or exist after the death of the sender. If the letters have eco-
nomic value because of the stature of the sender, this interest should
be protected under the same conditions that govern the protection of
any economic interest.
Disclosure of Arrests Not Terminating in Conviction
The problem arises in this area simply because police officers,
prosecutors and many citizens, particularly employers, do not believe
that a man is innocent until proven guilty. Rather they assume that
an arrest has independent significance and that "good people" are
not arrested. When an arrest does not terminate in conviction, it is
only because "he got off on a technicality" or "he had a smart lawyer."
Employers wish to avoid taking a chance on people who have been
arrested. This may be equally true of dispensers of credit.
From the standpoint of the person whose arrest has not terminated
in conviction, the fact of arrest is a matter he does not want revealed
for these reasons. The public may consider him guilty, he may be
refused employment or credit, and he may be a prime suspect for
future crimes both in the place where he was arrested and elsewhere
if the fact of arrest and accompanying data is disclosed to police in
other cities. The issue is whether he can obtain an injunction against
such disclosure. In this context, we will really be concerned with the
substantive nature of the interest, that is, to what extent is privacy
protected against this type of disclosure. It is clear that injunctive
relief is necessary, as the damages could not be measured with any
degree of certainty.14 6 Moreover, governmental officials will be in-
145. See also Brex v. Smith, 104 N.J. Eq. 386, 146 Atd. 34 (1929), where the court pro-
tected the privacy of bank accounts from improper disclosure. A prosecuting attorney was
investigating corruption in the police department and sought to inspect the bank accounts
of all the policemen and their wives. The court concluded that he was on a "fishing
expedition" and that there was a right to have such records secret except where there was
probable cause to believe that they contained matters of public concern. The injunction
was granted. Even though damages might be recoverable, the court held they were too
speculative to constitute an adequate remedy. Cf. Frey v. Dixon, 141 N.J. Eq. 481, 58 A.2d
86 (Chan. 1948), where the policemen who were called to appear with their records before
a grand jury pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum, sought an injunction against enforce-
ment of this requirement. It was held they had an adequate remedy by way of a motion
to quash the subpoena.
146. As the Missouri Supreme Court observed in State ex rel. Reed v. Harris, 348 Mo.
426, 153 S.W.2d 834, 837 (1941), in holding that a court had the power to award injunctive
relief in such a situation:
We are satisfied that an action at law for damages would not be an adequate
remedy. The damage, if any, flowing from the display of an innocent person's photo-
graph in the rogues' galleries throughout the country, is or might be a continuing
one, and not capable of any fair estimation or measurement by a money judgment.
The remedy at law would be incomplete, less prompt, and less efficient than resort
to equitable relief, and hence, would not constitute a bar to the latter.
[Vol. 9:147
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND PERSONAL INTEGRITY
volved as defendants, against whom recovery of damages probably
would not be authorized.
The clearest case where an injunction is proper is Itzkovitch v.
Whitaker.147 The plaintiff had been arrested on suspicion of being a
fence. He was photographed, and the photo was placed in a rogues
gallery open to the public. The police were also planning to send the
photo to police in other cities. The defendant argued that the court
had no authority to interfere with the police in the proper discharge
of their function of fighting crime. The court's answer was that the
plaintiff had never been convicted of any crime. If the picture was
displayed in a rogues gallery, it would be "permanent proof of dis-
honesty." The public who observed such pictures would not draw the
distinction between those innocent and those guilty. The court estab-
lished the rule that a photo could not be displayed in the rogues
gallery unless the person had been convicted of crime, and ordered
the negative returned to the plaintiff. 48
This principle has been recognized in a number of other cases. In
McGovern v. Van Ripper,1'49 the court refused to enjoin the taking
of photographs of the arrested person, but stated it would enjoin
any publication of them prior to conviction unless the plaintiff should
become a fugitive from justice, observing that an innocent person
is defamed by such publication. Here the state claimed that publica-
tion was authorized by statute. The court held that to the extent the
statute authorized such dissemination, it was unconstitutional as an
unreasonable interference with an individual's good reputation and
the right to be let alone. There is no public interest in displaying
the photograph of a person who has been arrested unless such arrest
terminates in conviction. Once the arrest has terminated in conviction,
any injury to reputation or privacy was classified as "negligible."
In State ex rel. Mavity v. Tyndall, 50 the court held that a mandatory
injunction would be granted to require removal of the photo from
the rogues gallery after the plaintiff had been acquitted. It said that
the complaint stated a "prima facie case of a violation .of the right of
privacy." In Downs v. Swan,' 5' a case involving sufficiency of the
complaint, the court held that the complaint would be dismissed,
since it only alleged that photographs would be taken and not that
they would be displayed in a rogues gallery even if the plaintiff were
acquitted. The court observed as follows:
[B]ut we must not be understood by so doing [dismissing the com-
plaint] to countenance the placing in the rogues gallery of the
photograph of any person, not a habitual criminal, who has been
147. Supra note 15.
148. See the discussion of this case and approval of the result in Bennett, supra note
11, at 688-89.
149. 137 N.J. Eq. 24, 43 A.2d 514 (1945).
150. 224 Ind. 364, 66 N.E.2d 755 (1946).
151. 111 Md. 53. 73 Atl. 653 (1909).
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arrested, but not convicted, on a criminal charge, or the publication
under these circumstances of his Bertillon record. Police officers
have no right to needlessly or wantonly injure in any respect persons
whom they are called upon in the course of their duty to arrest or
detain, and for the infliction of any such injury they would be liable
to the injured person in the same manner and to the same extent
that private individuals would be.1 52
However, an injunction is not necessary where the public will not
see the photographs. In Hansson v. Harris,153 the plaintiff sought to
enjoin the chief of police from placing the photos in a "rogues
gallery." The court found that this was not a rogues gallery in that
it was not open to the public. The photos were indexed by crime, and
only persons seeking to identify suspects were permitted to enter.
Thus, the court concluded that injury present in the other cases would
not be present here. In Kolb v. O'Connor,1 5 4 the court refused to en-
join as an invasion of privacy retention of photos and other identifica-
tion records after acquittal where they would be exhibited only to
victims of crime for identification of suspects. The court specifically
recognized that today's innocent citizen may be tomorrow's criminal;
this is judicial acceptance of the fact that we do not really believe that
an acquitted person is necessarily innocent. And in the Tyndall case,
the court indicated that the injunction would not be granted if the
gallery was not open to the public.
It would seem then that an injunction will be granted except
when the photos will not be used by anyone other than the police.
This raises a more difficult question: should the retention of the photos
by the police be enjoined, or their dissemination to law enforcement
officers elsewhere. There is the danger that persons will be incorrectly
identified as suspects and possibly be convicted. As we discussed pre-
viously, police simply are unwilling to accept a judgment of acquittal
as proof of innocence in many cases. It can be contended that in
these circumstances the court is interfering with the work of the
police in crime detection. The risk of misidentification is one that any
criminal defendant bears. If the police feel that the fact that a
person has been arrested is of some relevance in crime detection,
this should be within their discretion. The court's concern should be
solely with the protection from disclosure of the person's picture
to the public. Therefore, an injunction should not be granted against
retention nor dissemination to police officers in other cities unless the
pictures will be publicly displayed in those cities. The court should
permit dissemination only upon condition that the photos would not
be so displayed. By such an approach the courts reach a proper accom-
modation between the interest of the police in law enforcement and
the interest of the citizen in not suffering injury to his reputation and
152. 73 Ati. at 656.
153. 252 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
154. 14 I1. App. 2d 81, 142 N.E.2d 818 (1957).
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right to be let alone by being branded as a criminal, though he was
not convicted.
The same reasoning is applicable to arrest records. In Miller v.
Gillespie,15 5 the court refused to order the police department to sur-
render the arrest record after conviction. It noted that it was necessary
to have a record of police activities for future use. It also observed
that there was no question of the plaintiff's being exposed to public
ridicule as a result. So long as the record stays within the police files
or is circulated to other law enforcement agencies, there has been no
interference with the plaintiff's rights. But, under the same reasoning
as applicable in the photo situation, if these records are made public
or disclosed to persons such as employers, there has been an invasion.
The police are permitting him to be treated as if he was convicted,
which he was not. It is no one's concern that he has an arrest record
where the arrests did not terminate in conviction. Consequently such
disclosure should be enjoined.156 In all these instances the public
interest can be adequately protected by permitting the police to retain
these matters of identification, and the individual's interest likewise
by preventing disclosure to the public at large or private individuals
having no connection with law enforcement. 57
Improper Exposure or Use of Name
Here we are dealing with the traditional concept of tortious inva-
sion of privacy. As the Restatement puts it:
A person who unreasonably and seriously interferes with another's
interest in not having his affairs known to others or his likeness
exhibited to the public is liable to the other. 158
There are two distinct aspects to this tort. First, there is the unauthor
ized use of a person's name or likeness for advertising or other com-
mercial purposes. Secondly, there is the publication of reports about
a person where the report is not "newsworthy" or is embellished or
fictional. We are not now concerned with the substantive law as to
what constitutes an invasion of privacy. 59 It is recognized that many
155. 196 Mich. 423, 163 N.W. 22 (1917).
156. This was done in a lower court case in St. Louis. Cissel v. Brostron, No. 31383
(St. Louis Cir. Ct. 1962). Although an appeal was taken, St. Louis Daily Record, Jan. 31,
1963, no official disposition of the appeal can be found.
157. The mere taking of fingerprints has not been enjoined. Kolb v. O'Connor, supra
note 154; State ex rei. Mavity v. Tyndall, supra note 150. Fingerprints are taken routinely
in many situations today. Moreover, they are not "open to the public." Cf. Norman v.
City of Las Vegas, 64 Nev. 38, 177 P.2d 442 (1947), where the court upheld as constitu-
tional a city ordinance requiring employees of bars and retail liquor stores to submit
to fingerprinting, such fingerprints to be forwarded to neighboring and federal law
enforcement officers. The court noted that there was no question of a "rogue's gallery"
here.
158. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 867 (1939).
159. The classic article which was to a great degree responsible for the recognition of
the tort, Warren and Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890), should
still be read today for an understanding as to the substantive nature of the tort. An excel-
lent discussion of the substantive law will be found in Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285.
297 Pac. 91 (1931).
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items are newsworthy and that the public has a right to hear about
its "leaders, heroes, public figures and victims." Our concern is
whether once it has been established that the actions of the defendant
constitute an invasion of privacy, injunctive relief is available to sup-
press future publication.
It is well established that the unauthorized use of a person's name
or likeness for advertising or other commercial purposes can be en-
joined. The leading case establishing this proposition is Edison v.
Edison Polyform Co.,160 where Thomas Edison's name and picture
were used to advertise the defendant's products. Protection is not
limited to "famous persons." In McCreery v. Miller's Grocerteria,'6 1
the plaintiff hired a photographer to take her picture. He took the
picture and gave the negative to a coffee company and grocery
company, which they used to advertise the coffee. The court held
that an injunction would lie to restrain such use.
Here the court is protecting the person's interest in his privacy
and feelings. The plaintiff may not want his name or picture used to
advertise any or certain products. More significantly, however, a true
property interest is involved, and injunctive protection is proper as a
matter of commercial necessity. Indorsement of products, both by
famous personages and ordinary users, has become quite common.
Businessmen are satisfied that such endorsements increase sales and con-
sequently is willing to pay for them. One company's obtaining an
indorsement will go for naught if another company can pirate the
indorsement and be liable only in damages to the owner, since the
price paid by the first company may have reflected exclusive indorse-
ment rights. Also using an individual's indorsement without his con-
sent deprives him of his bargaining power; the defendant may use the
indorsement knowing he will have to pay only what a jury may award
some years later. Consequently an injunction here protects economic
interests as well as personal ones, and it is undisputed that injunctive
relief is available.
Where no commercial question is involved, the courts have been
more ambivalent. Consider the following situation: the plaintiff
is a reformed prostitute living with her husband and family in a
suburban community; it is many years since she has abandoned
her trade; the defendant is planning to publish a story about her
career as a prostitute. 6 2 Should an injunction be granted once the
court decides that the story is not "newsworthy" and hence the pub-
lication constitutes an invasion of privacy? Obviously, damages cannot
be adequate to compensate for the injury to feelings and to reputation
that result from the publication. 16 If an injunction is to be refused,
160. 73 N.J. Eq. 136, 67 Atl. 392 (Chan. 1907).
161. 99 Colo. 499, 64 P.2d 803 (1936).
162. These are basically the facts in Melvin v. Reid, supra note 159.
163. For a discussion of the damages recoverable for such an invasion see Eick v. Perk
Dog Food Co., 347 Ill. App. 293, 106 N.E.2d 742 (1952).
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it can only be because it would improperly inhibit free expression.
But before the court finds the conduct to be an invasion of privacy,
it must find that the publication is not newsworthy, that is, the public
has no interest in finding out about the subject matter of the publica-
tion. Employing the test we did in the defamation area,'6 4 it is
contended that an injunction is proper. Serious injury to sensibilities
and reputation can result from the publication of something that
admittedly the public has no interest in hearing about. The tort pro-
tects private and unknown individuals against having their affairs
revealed to the public at large or their sensibilities wounded by dis-
closure or dissemination of matters personal to them. If we admit
that the public has no interest in hearing about these items, free
expression-insofar as emphasis is placed upon the public's right to
know-should be no bar to protection by injunctive relief.
The problem is that the unrealistic approach to defamatory publica-
tion may be followed here. This fallacy combined with syllogism, can
be employed to prevent issuance of an injunction: defamation can
never be enjoined because of interference with free expression (fal-
lacious); publication of a matter invading privacy involves expression;
ergo, publication invading privacy cannot be enjoined. This was
followed to a "logical inconsistency" in Corliss v. E. W. Walker 6 5
The plaintiffs sought to prevent the publication of a biography of
their husband and father, a well-known inventor, and the use of a
photograph of him on the ground that such publication would injure
their feelings. In the first place there is great doubt as to whether
the publication would constitute any wrong: the inventor was dead
and at least at that time and probably today, the mere publication
of a person's life story could not be said to be an invasion of the
privacy of his descendants. Moreover, the court emphasized that it
did not consider him to be a private character. The result then is
justifiable on the ground that the actions of the defendant did not
constitute an invasion of privacy.
But the court went on the ground that under no circumstances
could it prohibit the publication of the biography in view of the
constitutional guarantee of free expression. Thus, in. our example,
the "biography" of the reformed prostitute, even if not newsworthy,
could not be enjoined, since it involved expression. However, the.
court did enjoin the use of the photograph, since it was obtained from
the plaintiffs on certain conditions and the defendant breached those
conditions. So, in our example, if she told him the story on the
condition that he not publish it, this could be enjoined, but not if
he found the story out on his own.
The criticisms of the attitude toward the enjoining of a defamatory
publication are applicable even more strongly here. The matter ad-
164. See the discussion, supra notes 81-89 and accompanying text.
165. 57 Fed. 434 (C.C. Mass. 1893).
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mittedly is not newsworthy. Damages clearly are inadequate. Since
the public has no interest in knowing about the matter, the public
interest in hearing expression is not affected by the issuance of the
injunction.
Other cases have taken a more realistic approach. In Bazemore v.
Savanah Hospital,'66 a case involving sufficiency of the complaint,
the plaintiff sought recovery of damages and an injunction against
the defendant's publication .of a photograph of the nude and mal-
formed body of the plaintiff's deceased child. The child had been
born deformed and had died shortly thereafter. The court held that
the publication would invade the privacy of the plaintiff and cause
her to suffer embarrassment and mental anguish. The court did not
expressly discuss injunctive relief, but assumed the injunction would
lie. By deciding that the publication would constitute an invasion
of privacy the court decided that the public had no interest in seeing
this photograph.
However, I would assume that most courts today would deny the
injunctions against publication of a story on grounds of protection
of free expression without considering the realities of the situation.
This, as well as the fact that in these publication cases, the injury
is not discovered until it is too late to seek injunctive relief, accounts
for the paucity of cases that research has disclosed. The lower court
case of Clayman v. Bernstein,167 however, may represent a trend in
the opposite direction. The defendant, a physician treating the plaintiff
for facial injuries, took photographs of her, showing facial disfigure-
ment. He had not published them nor was there any evidence he was
going to do so. The plaintiff claimed that his possession of them
caused her to suffer mental anguish. The court held that the com-
plaint stated a cause of action for injunctive relief. Presumably the
same rationale-protection of her feelings, which were injured by
the existence of this photograph-would justify an injunction against
publication. The court recognized that the analogy to libel law was
fallacious.168
In New York the matter is covered by statute, and it is settled that
the injunction will be issued against an unauthorized use of a photo-
graph or story for any purpose. In Blumenthal v. Picture Classics,1 9
it was held that a street vendor could enjoin the use in a movie of a
picture of her taken without her knowledge while she was at work.
The court stated that the statute gave an absolute right to an injunc-
166. 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930).
167. 38 Pa. D. & C. 543 (1940).
168. See also Friedman v. Cincinnati Local Board, 6 Ohio Supp. 276 (1941), where the
court enjoined a striking union from taking photographs and motion pictures of customers
entering the plaintiff's restaurant on the ground that this violated the right to privacy of
his customers. The court held that an ordinary individual has the right to insist upon his
privacy and that the plaintiff could assert the privacy rights of his customers, since these
rights were interfered with in order to affect his business.
169. 235 App. Div. 570, 257 N.Y.S. 800, aff'd mem., 261 N.Y. 504, 185 N.E. 713 (1932).
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tion whenever an invasion of privacy through unauthorized use was
shown.170 For whatever reason, the publication of this picture would
have been undesirable to the plaintiff. Since there was no public
interest in knowing what she was doing, the statute could constitu-
tionally be applied to restrain publication. The same reasoning would
justify an injunction in our case of the reformed prostitute, assuming
the court would find that the acts of the defendant constituted an
invasion of privacy.
On the other hand in Donahue v. Warner Brothers Pictures Corp.,171
the Utah statute authorizing an injunction against the improper use
of a person's name for trade purposes was construed as not applying to
a fictional portrayal of a person, but was limited to improper use
for advertising purposes. The case involves what constitutes an inva-
sion of privacy as a matter of substantive law and not the propriety of
injunctive relief. The court's concern with free expression played
a great part in its determination of the legislative intent. The same
result could have been reached by determining that the statute pro-
tected against all invasions of privacy when the defendant sought to
profit thereby, but that the person involved was a public figure (which
he probably was) and that the portrayal was not improperly embel-
lished. The restrictive reading of the statute ignores the fact that
the two aspects of the tort-improper use and publication of matters
not newsworthy-have traditionally been thought of as going together.
In summary, since damages are not adequate to compensate for
the mental suffering and possible injury to reputation that results
from such publication that constitutes an invasion of privacy, and
since by definition the public has no interest in hearing these matters,
injunctive relief should be granted.
THE RIGHT TO FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS
Third Party's Claim of Family Membership
Here the plaintiff finds it objectionable that a third party is claiming
a family relationship to him or claims the same family relationship
that the plaintiff claims. The cases have involved claims that a third
party is the plaintiff's child, his spouse, or that the third party is
married to the plaintiff's spouse.
The claim that a person is the plaintiff's child has its origin in
illicit relationships on the part of someone. In Vanderbilt v. Mitch-
ell,17 2 the plaintiff had not lived with his wife for some period
of time. As might be expected, the wife was living with someone else
and gave birth to a child. The wife falsely stated that the plaintiff
was the father of the child and had his name placed on the birth
170. See also Durgom v. C.B.S., 29 Misc. 2d 394, 214 N.Y.S.2d 752 (1961), holding that
the statute created an absolute right to enjoin the unauthorized use of the plaintiff's name
and that traditional defenses such as balancing of the relative hardships were inapplicable.
171. 2 Utah 2d 256, 272 P.2d 177 (1954).
172. 72 N.J. Eq. 910, 67 Atl. 97 (E. & A. 1907).
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certificate. It was undisputed that he had no access to her during
the possible period of gestation, so there was no question of the pre-
sumption of legitimacy. He sought an injunction to cancel the certifi-
cate and to enjoin the defendant and the child from using his name.
The court held that the injunction would lie, finding that a property
right existed, which at the time was thought to be a necessary require-
ment. The "property right" was that the "child of the plaintiff" had
certain rights under a will. It was also noted that the child could
make claims for support. Commentators have disagreed as to whether
the case really protected a "personal right" or whether a "substantial
property right" was involved.17 8 In fact property interests may be
threatened in a particular case. But this is beside the point. It would
seem to be intolerable to have a bastard claim to be your child, and
this to be a matter of public record. The personal interest involves
the sensibilities of the plaintiff; also our society places a great stress
on the "father concept." Just as a child should be entitled to a
declaration of paternity to establish his status, so too should a person
be entitled to a judicial declaration as to who his children are. Since
this is a substantial interest for which damages are obviously inade-
quate, injunctive relief is proper.
The converse of the situation was presented in Aimone v. Gerandi . 74
Here the plaintiff committed adultery with a married woman who
bore a child. She had his name placed on the birth certificate, and he
sought the same type of relief as that awarded in Vanderbilt. The court
held that he would be entitled to such relief. Despite his "immorality"
he would seem to have the right not to have a child that is not legally his
bear his name. More significantly such relief is desirable from the
standpoint of the innocent child. If his name is on the certificate, the
child would be bastardized, whereas if it is not the presumption of
legitimacy would operate to protect the child. On the merits the
court held that the presumption of legitimacy was overcome by proof of
non-access, and the name was not ordered removed. In either situa-
tion our society's emphasis on paternity justifies injunctive relief
to "set the record straight."
The next situation is where a party claims to be the plaintiff's
spouse. In Burns v. Stevens,175 the plaintiff sought to enjoin the
defendant from claiming to be his common law wife. The parties had
been living together, but were not married. The majority, once this
fact was established, held the injunction would issue as of course.
The dissenting justices found an absence of property rights and also
held that the plaintiff should be barred because of unclean hands.
Both arguments do not hold water, as the property requirement should
173. Professor Moreland treats the case as involving a personal right, supra note 11,
at 207-08, while Professor Bennett treats it as involving property rights, supra note 11, at
675-78.
174. 108 N.J. Eq. 339, 155 At. 12 (Chan. 1931).
175. 236 Mich. 443, 210 N.W. 482 (1926).
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be abandoned, and the improper conduct has been terminated. More
significantly-and this relates both to unclean hands and the propriety
of injunctive relief-it is societally desirable that marital status be
established. Since there was no common law marriage, confusion of
creditors and other persons would result if she were to continue to
hold herself out as his wife. Because of his misconduct, we may feel
that the injunctive process should not be employed to determine the
status of this relationship, but the possible interference with the
interests of innocent third parties justifies the injunction.
In Randazzo v. Ropollo,178 the defendant went through the form of
a marriage ceremony with a man impersonating the plaintiff. The
court held that he was entitled to a declaration that he was not mar-
ried to the defendant and an injunction restraining her from claiming
to be his wife. Here he is entirely innocent and even absent considera-
tions of harm to third parties, is entitled to an injunction. A person's
sensibilities (and possibly reputation) can clearly be harmed by having
another claiming to be his wife, whom he does not want.lT7 And in
State ex rel. Herzog v. Koelling,11 the injunction ran against the
recorder of deeds, who was required to cancel and expunge the
marriage record, where the marriage was invalid.
However, the plaintiff is not entitled to require the woman to
resume her maiden name. As a matter of substantive law a person is
entitled to take any name he chooses, so the injunction cannot prevent
this. He could, however, prevent her from using, "Mrs." and claiming
to be his wife.179
The most common situation is the one where injunctive relief
ordinarily should not be granted. That is where the husband has left
the wife, gone through a marriage ceremony with another woman, is
now living with her and she holds herself out as "Mrs. X." The first
wife seeks to enjoin her from living with him and/or from using the
name. These were essentially the facts in Bauman v. Bauman,50 where
the husband had obtained a Mexican divorce that the court would not
recognize. The court granted a declaratory judgment to the effect that
the second marriage was void, because the first was never terminated.
It held that this was all the relief she needed and refused to enjoin the
parties from living together or holding themselves out as man and wife.
The result is sound. There is some injury to feelings, but it is sub-
mitted that it is not the kind the court should protect by injunctive
relief, altering the lives of the husband and the other woman. The
170. 105 N.Y.S. 481 (Sup. Ct. 1906).
177. It is interesting to note that the court refused to annul the certificate of marriage
between the defendant and the imposter, since that marriage may have been valid. In any
event, the plaintiff did not go through the ceremony of marriage.
178. 229 S.W.2d 252 (Mo. App. 1950).
179. See Queen v. Queen, 135 N.Y.S.2d 536 (Sup. Ct. 1954), holding that the plaintiff
obtaining annulment could not require the woman to resume her maiden name, empha-
sizing the common law right of a person to choose his name.
180. 250 N.Y. 382, 165 N.E. 819 (1929).
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husband and the plaintiff were living apart, and there was no question
of reconciliation. No injury could arise to any tangible interest of the
plaintiff; there was no showing that she was a victim of impersonation.
There was no question of injury to innocent third parties; the husband
certainly would be liable for any debts the other woman incurred. The
expression, "hell hath no fury like a woman scorned," is applicable
here. The injury, if any, to the feelings and sensibilities of the plaintiff
occurred upon marital break-up. The increase due to the husband's
conduct (predictable at least in the sense that he will be having rela-
tions with another) is minimal. It is obvious that the plaintiff is being
vindictive, and this is not the type of interest that the law should pro-
tect. And where there was no allegation that the husband had gotten a
divorce or otherwise put into question the validity of his marriage to
the plaintiff, it has been held that the wife is not entitled to a declara-
tory judgment as to the subsistence of her marriage, even though the
husband is living with another woman.18'
In Schneider v. Schneider,18 2 it was the wife who was living with
another man. The husband obtained a declaration that she was still
legally married to him and sought to enjoin her from using the name
of her new lover. Relying on Bauman, the injunction was properly
denied, the court observing that it could not interfere in such matters.
Again, the injury to his feelings at having the wife using the name of
another, and even living with him, is minimal when compared to the
injury to the plaintiff's feelings upon the wife's leaving him. And in
Bartholomew v. Workman,83 it was held that minor children could not
enjoin a woman from claiming that she was married to their deceased
father. It is difficult to imagine any real injury to feelings of the type
the law should protect. And her merely claiming she was married
would not affect any property disputes.
However, where the complaint alleged that the wife had been
deprived of employment by reason of the confusion in names resulting
from the defendant's conduct in holding herself out as the husband's
real wife, it stated an action for injunctive relief. 8 4 This is an instance
where the interference with the personal interest is too insubstantial to
justify the granting of injunctive relief, but the effect on economic
interests is substantial enough so that the injunction will be granted. It
does not appear what happened subsequently. And in Niver v. Niver,8 5
where the court enjoined the husband and third party from seeking a
Mexican divorce, 8 6 it, as a matter of incidental relief, enjoined them
from holding themselves out as man and wife.
181. Somberg v. Somberg, 263 N.Y. 1, 188 N.E. 137 (1933).
182. 124 N.Y.S.2d 234 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
183. 197 Okla. 267, 169 P.2d 1012 (1946).
184. Kray v. Kray, 169 Misc. 658, 7 N.Y.S.2d 830 (1938).
185. 200 Misc. 993, 111 N.Y.S.2d 889 (1951).
186. The traditional antisuit injunction has frequently been employed to enjoin a
spouse from seeking a divorce in another state, where it is clear he is not abandoning 'the
forum as his domicile. See, e.g., Kempson v. Kempson, 58 N.J. Eq. 94, 43 Atl. 97 (Chan.
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In Gold v. Gold,1s8 a New York lower court granted an injunction
against the use of the name, against their living together and the hus-
band's supporting the third party where he was in arrears in his sup-
port payments to the plaintiff. The case has been criticized as an
attempt to evade Bauman,"' and the criticism is proper. As the author
points out, the wife had an adequate remedy by getting enforcement of
a court order for support, and the issuance of the injunction would no
more protect her rights to support than the order would. It is impos-
sible to see any causal connection between their living together and
holding themselves out as man and wife and the husband's failure to
obey a support decree.
It is submitted that the results reached by the courts in most of these
cases are sound. Public records should be accurate as to who is whose
child and who is married to whom. Moreover, the mental distress upon
being known as the father or spouse of someone who does not have that
relationship to the plaintiff, could be acute. But when the spouse has
"taken another" after leaving the plaintiff, it is difficult to see how the
feelings of the plaintiff will be substantially assuaged by having them
stop calling themselves man and wife. The real injury occurred when
the spouse left the plaintiff and anything else is de minimis.
Change of Child's Name
The situation here arises when husband and wife have been divorced
and, as is usual, the wife obtains custody of minor children. She remar-
ries and seeks to cause the child to identify with the stepfather rather
than the natural father. To accomplish this she calls the child by the
stepfather's name and has him registered in school by that name. She
may rationalize her conduct on the ground that confusion otherwise
results, particularly when the stepfather also has children of the same
age level as hers. The natural father objects to this, as he is struggling
to have the child identify with him. Parenthetically, it should be
observed that the identification problems created for the child are
immense. The question is whether the court will enjoin this conduct
by the mother.
In Mark v. Kahn,8 9 the court held that the father was entitled to an
injunction. It recognized that an intense personal interest was involved,
the right to have the plaintiff's child identify with him. It is more than
just a question of which name the child will bear. Rather the father is
struggling to have the child identify with him while the mother is try-
1899); Hammer v. Hammer, 303 N.Y. 481, 104 N.E.2d 864 (1952). However, the New York
courts will no longer issue injunctions against divorces in foreign states, since they do not
have presumptive validity and are not required to be recognized under the full faith and
credit clause. Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 309 N.Y. 371, 130 N.E.2d 902 (1955). The inno-
cent spouse may determine the invalidity of the foreign divorce in a declaratory judgment
proceeding.
187. 158 Misc. 570, 287 N.Y.S. 217 (1936).
188. Bennett, supra note 11, at 675.
189. 333 Mass. 517, 131 N.E.2d 758 (1956).
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ing to estrange the child from the natural father, as she is, and to
identify with the stepfather. The name under which the child goes will
be a significant factor-particularly in the case of a child of tender
years-in determining with whom the child will ultimately identify.
The court is merely removing an unfair weapon from the mother's
armory. A number of other cases have recognized this interest of the
father, 90 and no court to which the problem has been presented has
held that the mother arbitrarily may do this.
There are two conditions. First, the father must be contributing to
the support of the child. If the father has not shown a father's interest
in the child, then he cannot complain if the mother has caused the
child to identify with the stepfather, who, presumably is taking this
interest. A father who has ignored the child does not have the right to
suddenly disrupt the actions of the mother in doing what she believes
is best for it. The second is that the injunction will not be granted
unless it is in the best interests of the child. In Mark v. Kahn, the lower
court had dismissed the complaint. In reversing, the Supreme Court
did not order the issuance of the injunction, but ordered the trial judge
to take testimony on whether it would be in the best interests of the
child to go under the name of the natural father. The circumstances
may be such that going under the name of the natural father would be
psychologically and emotionally detrimental to the child.
Thus, in a case such as Binford v. Reid,'9' where the child had been
going under the stepfather's name since he was one year old, the court
held it to be in the best interests of the child for him to retain the
name. In Bilenkin v. Bilenkin,'192 where the daughter had been regis-
tered in school in the name of the stepfather from the time of the
mother's remarriage, the home of the child was several hundred miles
away from that of the father, and the father had delayed in asking for
relief, the court refused to require that the child be registered in school
under the name of the natural father. In other words, unless the father
brings action soon after he discovers that the child is using the name of
the stepfather, the court may well find that it is in the best interests of
the child to keep the name of the stepfather.193 Another qualification is
that where the child is at the age of discretion, he can choose the name
by which he wants to be known. By this time the conflict in identifica-
tion is resolved, and there is no need for judicial interference. In
Application of Shipley,1 4 the court held that children aged [eighteen,
fifteen, thirteen and eleven] were of the age of discretion.
190. Degenberg v. McCormick, 184 A.2d 468 (Del. Chan. 1962); Solomon v. Solomon,
5 Ill. App. 2d 297, 125 N.E.2d 675 (1955); Reed v. Reed, 338 P.2d 560 (Okla. 1959).
191. 83 Ga. App. 280, 63 S.E.2d 345 (1951). This was a proceeding to legally change the
name, but the holding would be equally applicable where injunctive relief was sought.
192. 78 Ohio App. 481, 64 N.E.2d 84 (1945).
193. Note the analogy to laches. Here there has been a lengthy delay and the position
of the child has been changed, so to speak.
194. 26 Misc. 2d 204, 205 N.Y.S.2d 581 (1960).
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In Margolis v. Margolis,195 the divorced wife who had not remarried
was registering the children under her maiden name which she had
resumed. The court found that this was not in the best interests of the
children and ordered that the children be registered in school and
known under the name of the father. This is clearly desirable, as
otherwise, doubts as to the children's legitimacy might arise in the
minds of others. Many divorced women do not resume their maiden
names when they have children so that the children will not have a
different name than the mother. And if they are not to have the same
name, they should not have the maiden name of the mother because of
possible confusion as to their status of legitimacy. An injunction will
also lie against the school authorities to require them to register the
child in the name of the natural father. 19 6 The court and not the school
board is the final arbiter as to what is in the best interests of the child.
There are no objections of practicability here. The name by which
the child is registered in school can be easily checked, and if the child
is known around the neighborhood by a different name, this too can be
ascertained. The court need not supervise the everyday conduct of the
mother, but can merely observe the result and require appropriate
action. A different question arises when the husband seeks to prevent
the wife and second husband from "alienating the child's affections
from him." In the only case in which the question arose, Reed v.
Reed,19 7 the court sidestepped the question by finding that there was
no evidence this was being done. Such a decree should never be granted.
It is impossible for the court to examine the everyday conduct of peo-
ple and to interfere in the delicate relationship of mother and child.
Alienation of affections can take place in many ways, subtle as well as
overt. As long as there is no interference with the visiting rights of the
father, he must fight his own battles for the child's affections. If the
mother is acting improperly, perhaps a change in custody can be
ordered. But the court cannot control the relations between a mother
and a child.
The results arrived at in these cases are sound, and represent recogni-
tion of an intense personal interest which can effectively be judicially
protected.
Parental and In-law Relationships
A few cases have involved the situation where the plaintiff seeks
relief from interference with his relationship with his parents or from
interference with his relationship with his spouse due to conduct of his
in-laws. Here too, the results arrived at are sound and in accord with
the capabilities of judicial power. In Reed v. Carter,98 the parties were
195. 338 Mass. 416, 155 N.E.2d 177 (1959).
196. Nitzberg v. Nitzberg, 200 Misc. 748, 104 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1950).
197. Supra note 190.
198. 218 Ky. 1, 103 S.W.2d 663 (1937).
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sisters. Their aged and infirm mother lived with one of them. The
parties agreed that the defendant, with whom the mother lived, would
not annoy the plaintiff or interfere with her visits to the mother. This
agreement was made as part of the settlement of litigation between the
sisters. The plaintiff contended that on her last visit the defendant
annoyed her and prevented her from conversing with their mother.
The court granted an injunction against such conduct in the future.
It said that as long as the mother wished to see the plaintiff, the defend-
ant would be enjoined from interfering. The decree imposes no great
restriction upon the home life of the defendant. She need not see the
plaintiff if she does not wish to do so. All she has to do is to leave the
plaintiff alone when she is visiting the mother. Under the agreement
the plaintiff had unrestricted rights to visit the mother. In the absence
of such an agreement, the court should impose some limits to the num-
ber of visits the plaintiff can make absent emergencies. It is practicable
to grant an injunction of this type, and the right to visit one's mother
is sufficiently substantial to justify judicial protection.
Interference by in-laws, however, stands on a different footing. It is
no secret that parents frequently do not approve of their offspring's
choice of a mate-and this disapproval may often not abate upon mar-
riage. Moreover, there would seem to be a natural rivalry between
in-laws and spouse for the attention of the spouse's partner and the
parents' child. Our obsession with "mother-in-law jokes" may reflect
our attempt to gloss over a serious societal problem by laughing at it.
This situation is most often before the courts in divorce actions, but on
occasion finds its way into a suit for injunctive relief.
In Devine v. Devine,1 9 the court was presented with a situation of
mother-wife rivalry over the son. At the mother's urging (she had
always disapproved of the marriage) the son left the wife, joined the
Army, and was now stationed in Korea. The plaintiff sought to enjoin
the mother from making false statements about her to the husband and
from attempting to break up the marriage. The injunction was refused,
although the court admitted the wife had no other remedy, since actions
for alienation of affections had been abolished. The ground of refusal
was impracticability. The court could not prohibit a mother from
communicating with her son-it observed that it could not be a "censor
of communications." It concluded that enforcement would present
"insurmountable difficulties. ' 20 0 In Pleet v. Bank,20 1 the husband
sought to enjoin the parents of the estranged wife, who had obtained a
divorce in another state (apparently assumed to be void), from inducing
the daughter to stay away and from furnishing her with support. The
husband had previously recovered damages in an action against the
199. 20 N.J. Super. 522. 90 A.2d 199 (Chan. 1952).
200. The court found that in the past the mother-in-law had harassed the plaintiff by
calling her at all hours of the night and hanging up. It found that this conduct, however,
had ceased and did not consider whether it should be enjoined.
201. 180 Md. 254. 23 A.2d 700 (1942).
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parents for alienation of affections. The court pointed out that parents
have a right to counsel and support children even if married,20 2 and
emphasized the difficulty of enforcement.203
In both of these cases the courts realized the limits of judicial power.
The court cannot interfere in the relationships between parents and
children and cannot put judicial power on the side of the spouse. If
parents feel the child has made a bad marriage, the court should not
prevent them from persuading the child to that effect. Moreover, the
court cannot take the time, nor should it, to make sure the parents are
using "fair means." Spouse-in-law relationships are simply too delicate
for the injunctive process to touch. Unlike Reed v. Carter, a permis-
sive order only is not sought. The court cannot regulate the conduct of
a parent with respect to his child, and if the spouse cannot successfully
compete with the parent, his remedy lies in a divorce proceeding.
Illicit Relationships With Third Parties
Here we will discuss the availability of injunctive relief to a plaintiff
whose spouse is engaged in illicit relationships with third parties or
otherwise subjected to alienation of affection from the plaintiff or a
parent whose child is engaged in such a relationship. The great number
of cases involve spousal relationships, and research has only disclosed
one case involving a seduced child.
In Ex parte Warfield,20 4 the court enjoined the defendant from
associating with the plaintiff's wife and speaking or writing or commu-
nicating with her ha any manner. The complaint alleged that the
defendant had succeeded in partially alienating the wife's affections
and if not restrained, would succeed in alienating them fully, destroy-
ing the marriage. The defendant violated the injunction, and release
on habeas corpus was denied. The court held that there was no other
adequate remedy to protect the marriage-damages would obviously
have been inadequate-and thus the court had the power to issue the
injunction.2 5 In White v. Bauderer,20 6 the plaintiff's wife was the
defendant's secretary. She was suing the plaintiff for divorce, which he
was resisting. The defendant carried on with the wife openly and
taunted the plaintiff about this. Interestingly enough, the court found
that adultery had not been committed. Here the injunction ordered
the defendant not to have anything to do with the plaintiff's wife
"except as related to her duties as his employee." The court did not say
how this decree was to be enforced or establish criteria as to what
202. It may be asked why this right was not a defense to the action to recover damages
for alienation of affections.
203. The court also went on to say that "equity protects only property rights," and
found that consortium was not a property right.
204. 40 Tex. Crim. 413, 50 S.W. 933 (1899).
205. The court implied that the statute removed its discretion to refuse injunctive relief
when the plaintiff showed violation of a substantive right for which damages would be
inadequate.
200. 255 S.W. 1016 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
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would constitute prohibited conduct. For example, if she came to work
one day crying because her husband had abused her, would the defend-
ant's comforting her and telling her everything was the husband's fault,
constitute an attempt to alienate her affections or would it be an
attempt to enable her to efficiently perform her duties as an employee?
Or would a "pat on the behind" (a common practice in many offices)
be a friendly gesture toward an employee or an attempt at alienation of
affections and seduction? The court did not attempt to answer these
questions nor could it. But they point out the difficulty in trying to
regulate relations between people by judicial decree.
The Alabama courts have also held that such conduct can be en-
joined. In Henley v. Rockett,20 7 the court ordered the defendant to stop
receiving gifts from the plaintiff's husband, from visiting and associat-
ing with him, from meeting him clandestinely, from going on trips
with him, or from doing any act tending to interfere with his giving the
plaintiff the companionship to which she was entitled. This was a May-
December situation. The husband was sixty-four years old, had just re-
tired and the evidence indicated he had started to drink a great deal.
The defendant was thirty-six. The court attributed his conduct to his
drinking and observed that putting a stop to the affair might "open the
way for his mastery over the drinking habit."208 The parties were neigh-
bors, and the court held that the decree did not affect the "defendant's
right to speak to him as a neighbor." It observed that she knew what
was proper deportment. This is an attempt to answer the type of objec-
tions that were raised in the preceding paragraph. Still, this overlooks
the fact that the wife would have an entirely different view of proper
deportment than the defendant. The problem would be that anytime
there was contact between the defendant and the husband, the wife
might seek a judicial determination as to whether her deportment was
"proper." For example, the defendant is sunning herself in an abbrevi-
ated costume, and the husband saunters over. It is not difficult to see
the wife appearing in court on a motion to cite the defendant for con-
tempt, alleging that she "flaunted herself in front of him," attempting
to alienate his affections. Could she ask the husband to "take something
out of her eye" or would this involve his getting too intimate with her?
In all such cases the court risks acting beyond the range of its effective
power when it attempts to regulate the intimate personal conduct of
people.20 9
The majority of the courts before whom the question has come have
recognized the limitations on judicial power. The leading case taking
207. 243 Ala. 172, 8 So. 2d 852 (1942).
208. Damage actions for alienation of affections had been abolished. The court held
that the statute did not prohibit the granting of injunctive relief.
209. See also Latham v. Karger, 267 Ala. 433, 103 So. 2d 336 (1958), where the court
affirmed the principle of Henley and held that a cause of action for injunctive relief
would lie. It had been contended that the court should abandon the granting of such
relief in view of the actions taken by other states.
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this position is Snedaker v. King.210 The plaintiff sought to enjoin a
"vamp" from alienating the affections of her husband. The lower court
enjoined the defendant from visiting or associating with the plaintiff's
husband, going near him or to any place where he might be, writing or
communicating with him in any manner, and doing anything to pre-
vent his giving the plaintiff the full love, affection and the like to which
she was entitled." The court in a per curiam opinion reversed, charac-
terizing the decree as an "extreme instance of government by injunc-
tion." It pointed out that the plaintiff had adequate statutory remedies
to obtain support for herself and the children, and that there was no
evidence the husband had failed properly to support them. Very suc-
cinctly it summed up the objections to an injunction here:
Such extension of the jurisdiction of equity to regulate and control
domestic relations, in addition to legal and statutory remedies already
provided, in our opinion, is not supported by authority, warranted by
sound reason, or in the interest of good morals or public policy. The
opening of such a wide field for injunctive process, enforceable only by
contempt proceedings, the difficulty if not impossibility of such enforce-
ment, and the very doubtful beneficial results to be obtained thereby,
warrant the denial of such a decree in this case. .... 211
In a concurring opinion, Judge Allen, a woman incidentally, pin-
pointed three telling arguments against the issuance of an injunction.
First, the order would be unusually difficult of enforcement. In the
ordinary injunction there is the prohibition against the doing of some
act which will involve an indifferent third party. Here proof of a viola-
tion would depend largely upon the testimony of two people, who
rather than being indifferent, are intimately involved with each other.
She observed that it would be difficult to see how the injunction could
be enforced without "permanently attaching a probation officer to
both." Secondly, the order restrained all contact between two people,
which is impossible. As she observed:
Under this order, what is Miss Snedaker to do if she passes King upon
the street? Must she cross the street in order not to go "near him . ..
at . .. any .. .place where said Homer King may be," or may she
stay upon the same side of the street and pass him? Under such circum-
stances may she say "good morning" to him, or in so doing will she be
violating the order that she is not to communicate with King "by
word"? 212
We have previously given other examples of this type of situation. And
whether or not the defendant knows what is prohibited of her, the
plaintiff may still be in court demanding contempt every time there is
some contact, however innocent. The amount of judicial time that
could be taken up in superintendence is unlimited.213 Thirdly, she
210. 111 Ohio St. 225, 145 N.E. 15 (1924).
211. 145 N.E. at 17.
212. Ibid.
213. See the discussion in Moreland, supra note 11, at 211.
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pointed out that the injunction would merely add "fuel to the flame."
This would make the wrongdoer even "more alluring to the husband."
We can see from the experience of Prohibition the effect of trying to
stifle normal instincts of people and the "forbidden fruit" mentality
that results.
To these objections I would like to add two others. First, the issuance
of such a decree causes disrespect for the legal processes, because it is
not likely to be obeyed. It is one thing to order a person to deliver a
ton of coal, or to cease trespassing on real property, or even to leave a
person alone; it is another to tell him that he cannot see a person
whom, for one reason or another he thinks he "loves," and with whom
he has probably been physically intimate. The needs involved may
reflect deep-seated, psychological problems, which are immune to
judicial control. Moreover, the parties probably believe they can vio-
late the decree and remain undetected. All the decree means is that
their meetings will be clandestine. The injured spouse may resort to
private detectives. If they are successful in avoiding detection, as they
may be, then they and those who are familiar with the situation will
have lost respect for the law. In any event, the public may well wonder
why the courts are concerned with matters such as this when auto-
mobile injury cases, involving perhaps permanent and serious injuries,
are delayed for trial three or four years.
Finally, and what to the writer is most significant, is the fact that he
finds it difficult to believe that the plaintiff is "free from fault." Absent
real psychological problems-in which case an injunction is likely to be
ineffective anyhow-we can ask whether a happily married person is
likely to have his "affections alienated." Will the husband who has a
devoted and loyal wife, be "seduced by a vamp"? Of course people
fantasize. The middle-aged businessman may imagine himself sur-
rounded by a bevy of beautiful and scantily clad chorus girls, but I
doubt if he would leave his wife to live with one. This is not to say that
he may not occasionally stray in action as well as thought, but that is a
different thing from leaving the wife. The housewife, surrounded by
dirty diapers and dishes, may imagine herself transported away by a
"Prince Charming." But if confronted with the situation, I cannot
picture her leaving the dishes and diapers.
Rather, is not the situation, despite allegations to the contrary, one
where the plaintiff has not himself shown the spouse the love and affec-
tion he or she needs? Has the plaintiff husband satisfied the wife's need
for a companion and lover? Has the plaintiff wife "let herself go to pot"
after marriage and come to look upon her husband as a "meal ticket"?
It would seem that when affection has been alienated to the extent that
an injunction is sought, the marriage can no longer be preserved and is
not worth preserving in any event. Where the plaintiff has lost his
spouse to a rival, should he be able to obtain the court's coercion to
preserve the marriage? Should he be entitled to fail to satisfy the needs
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of the other spouse and then use the judicial processes to force the
spouse to associate only with him?
Marriage does not involve the concept of "chained for life." Irrespec-
tive of the liberality of divorce laws or even whether a divorce is sought,
the fact remains that some marriages work and others do not. Marriage
is probably the most intimate relationship we know. Its success or
failure depends on many intangibles, on everyday actions, on considera-
tion and ultimately on affection. Where a person cannot obtain the
affection he needs and desires from his spouse, he may very well seek to
obtain it from others. The "guilty person" is less likely to be the third
party than the plaintiff who is now seeking judicial relief. Would a
normal person enjoying a happy home life-absent psychological prob-
lems that cannot be altered by a judicial decree-be likely to forsake a
spouse he loves for an illicit relationship with a third party? The plain-
tiff spouse has-or had-an adequate remedy: that of acting properly
and considerately and supplying the affection that the spouse must now
seek elsewhere.
Professor Bennett has effectively demonstrated the soundness of this
approach. He has observed:
The Snedaker v. King decision focuses attention on the real problem in
this group of cases-the practicability and social desirability of attempt-
ing to enforce matrimonial harmony by injunction. As a matter of fact
injunctive relief is seldom sought except in a spirit of jealous retalia-
tion. A plaintiff who drags the family name and reputation through
the muck of sordid publicity attending such an action can scarcely
entertain any genuine hope for domestic rehabilitation. Such is the
perversity of human nature that the injunction, if granted, will almost
evitably drive the prodigal husband away from, rather than toward,
the loving embraces of the legally victorious wife. Then, too, many
domestic triangles are traceable to deep-rooted family difficulties and
incompatibilities, or to an inborn infidelity on the part of the wayward
spouse, rather than to the opportunities of any particular adventuress.
Though the court may say "hands off" to the present recipient of the
misdirected affections, it cannot effectively say, "love your wife" to the
erring spouse.214
In other words, the law can formulize the marriage relationship or
terminate it, but it cannot preserve it, since such preservation depends
on too many intangibles and intimacies beyond judicial control. In
refusing to enjoin such conduct the courts have emphasized the imprac-
ticability of enforcement of the decree.215 It has also been observed that
the proper remedy for the offended spouse is a divorce. 216 This recog-
nizes the inability of the law to preserve the marriage relationship.
In Pashko v. Pashko,217 an Ohio court, despite the holding of Sned-
214. Bennett, supra note 11, at 671.
215. White v. Thompson, 324 Mass. 140, 85 N.E.2d 246 (1949); Rose v. Aaron, 345 Mich.
613, 76 N.W.2d 829 (1956). See also Diamond v. Diamond, 372 Pa. 562, 94 A.2d 569 (1953),
where the wife sought an injunction only against the commission of adultery, which was
refused.
216. Hadley v. Hadley, 323 Mich. 555, 36 N.W.2d 144 (1949).
217. 101 N.E.2d 804 (Ohio C.P. 1951).
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aker v. King, granted an injunction temporarily restraining the parties
from seeing each other. The wife had brought an action for separation
and alimony against the husband. The court said that it had a duty to
attempt to reconcile the parties and observed that there was a six week
waiting period before a divorce action or one for permanent alimony
could be heard. It concluded that this represented a policy of attempt-
ing a reconciliation. Nonetheless, the objections in Snedaker are equally
applicable here. This decree will not achieve a reconciliation for the
simple reason that it probably will not be obeyed. A contrary result
was reached in Pearce v. Pearce,2 18 where the order accompanying the
interlocutory divorce decree restrained the wife from seeing her para-
mour until the decree became final. The court held this was unenforce-
able and was too great a restraint on the wife's liberty.
In Knighton v. Knighton,2 9 the Alabama court refused to apply the
holding in Henley v. Rockett, to a situation where the plaintiff and her
husband were no longer living together. There the wife was seeking
separate maintenance, which caused the court to conclude that the
injunction would be in vain. It is submitted that it is no more effective
when they are still living together. Where affection has ceased, it can-
not be rekindled by judicial decree, and where the situation is such that
one party feels he must resort to injunctive relief, it is as if they had
ceased living together. As a practical situation, they are roomers
together rather than man and wife. Knighton, however, does represent
a realization of the fact that affection cannot be restored by the court.
The only difference between this and the other cases is the court's
opinion as to the time when this takes place.
A situation where a restraint on association is practicable and sound
occurred in Aubry v. Aubry.220 The court had found that neither
divorced parent was a fit person to have custody of the child and gave
it to the husband's mother. The natural mother had visitation rights.
The decree required that when she had custody she was not to be in the
company of her paramour, whom the court characterized as responsible
for the marital break-up. Here there is no attempt to interfere with the
relationship. The restraint is partial and desirable from the standpoint
of the child. His interest and the fact that the decree is more likely to
be obeyed-the child could probably report a violation-makes the
issuance of the injunction practicable.
In Stark v. Hamilton,221 the court dealt with the issue of whether an
injunction should be issued to restrain a third person from associating
with a minor. The defendant had induced the plaintiff's daughter to
leave her parents and live with him in adultery. The court ordered him
to bring the child back to her parents' home and to refrain from associ-
218. 37 Wash. 2d 918, 226 P.2d 845 (1951).
219. 252 Ala. 50, 41 So. 2d 172 (1949).
220. 26 Wash. 2d 69, 173 P.2d 121 (1946).
221. 149 Ga. 227, 99 S.E. 861 (1919).
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ating with her. Here it is submitted the result is correct. It may not be
too late for the injunction to have some effect. The court does have a
special responsibility to protect children.222 More significantly, the
emotional involvement is not as intense as in the spouse-paramour
situation. The minor may have been infatuated with the defendant,
and assuming proper parental control, this infatuation is more likely
to be eliminated than in the case of the spouse.22 3 While the defend-
ant's psychological problems may be such that he will not obey the
injunction, still, if they are not that serious, his degree of involvement
may not be such as the adult lovers. In any event, the immaturity of the
child-the basis for many rules of law relating to minors-justifies the
making of the judicial effort.
In dealing with family relationships the courts must recognize the
limitations to their power. They must also recognize the intensity of
the relationships. This is relevant both as to the granting of relief and
the refusal to do so. Where enforcement is practicable, such as in the
case of changing of a child's" name, the father's feeling for his child and
the desire to have the child bear his name justify the granting of injunc-
tive relief. But in the alienation of affections situation the intensity of
relationships and the spouse's estrangement from the plaintiff makes
the granting of relief impracticable. In other words, judicial power
should be employed to enforce a person's interest in these relationships
except where the nature of the relationship is such that its preservation
is beyond the ken of judicial power.
THE RIGHT TO BELONG
The issue here is under what circumstances the court will order
reinstatement 224 of membership when a person has been improperly
expelled from an association of which he is a member.225 Leaving for
the moment the question of what constitutes improper expulsion, there
is the question of what kind of association must be involved before the
court will consider whether the expulsion was improper. When the
courts were operating under the notion that "equity protected only
property rights," 226 it was necessary to show a "property right" in the
association. This did not necessarily mean that the association was one
to which the plaintiff belonged for economic reasons such as a trade
222. See the discussion of this point in Moreland, supra note 11, at 220-24.
223. See the discussion of this point in Bennett, supra note 11, at 673.
224. Ordinarily injunctive relief is sought, but some courts have held that mandamus
is the proper remedy. See Bernstein v. Alameda-Contra Costa Medical Association, 139
Cal. App. 2d 241, 293 P.2d 862 (1956); Costa v. La Luna Servante, 255 Ala. 6, 49 So. 2d
672 (1950); Monroe v. Colored Screwmen's Benevolent Association, 133 La. 893, 66 So. 260(1914).-
225. We are not concerned with the substantive right to become a member of an asso-
ciation. Obviously, if such a right were recognized, injunctive relief would be proper, as
damages could not be measured for the deprivation.
226. The classic article is Chafee, The Internal AIfairs of Associations Not for Profit,
43 HARV. L. Rav. 993 (1930). See the discussion of the technical property right requirement
at 999-1001. Interestingly enough the author said he did not foresee its abandonment.
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association. It could be legitimately contended that the courts should
not become involved in membership hassles, that the right to belong
to an association is not sufficient to warrant judicial protection, but that
such protection should extend only to economic interests which depend
on organizational membership. But this is not the tack the courts have
taken. If a technical property right could be found, full protection
would be extended; in the absence of such a property right, no protec-
tion would be given, even though as at least one case will indicate, real
economic interests were affected by membership in the association.
The fallacy of the requirement of a technical property right is best
demonstrated by the holding in Baird v. Wells, 227 that a member
wrongfully expelled from a proprietary club cannot obtain injunctive
relief ordering reinstatement. Since the member had no rights to a
share of the assets upon dissolution, there was no property right. But if
the club were organized in such a manner that the membership had a
right to the assets upon dissolution, then there would be a property
right and injunctive relief would be available, as the court pointed out.
In either instance, however, the interest of the member is in the associ-
ational relationship and not the assets. 228 A member does not join a
club in the hopes of sharing in the assets upon dissolution. Rather he
joins it for the social companionship, the prestige of belonging and
other intangible factors. Thus, the question of a right to the assets upon
dissolution-a circumstance which the member hopes will not occur-
is irrelevant in determining whether injunctive relief should be avail-
able. Even though damages may be available for wrongful ouster, 229
they are obviously inadequate because of the intangible nature of the
interest involved.- 0 If injunctive relief is not granted, the associational
interest, which is what the member is really trying to protect,2 1 is
destroyed.
In Wellenvoss v. Grand Lodge, Knights of Pythias of Kentucky,282
for example, the plaintiff was elected by a subordinate lodge to be a
delegate to the grand lodge, apparently a form of permanent member-
ship in the latter body, which was a great honor. The court held that
no property rights were involved. The delegate had no interest in the
assets of the grand lodge, and the subordinate lodge would lose no
money if he were not a delegate. This ignores the fact that the interest
involved was the right to belong and that the question of assets was
irrelevant on this issue.' 8
227. Law Reports, 44 Chan. Div. 661 (1890).
228. See the discussion of this point in de Funiak, supra note 11, at 26.
229. See the result in The Bath Club Case, 70 SOL. J. 828 (1926).
250. Professor Chafee has contended that damages should not be recoverable for the
wrongful ouster, but only for such denial of pecuniary rights such as sick benefits. Chafee,
supra note 226, at 1010-13. He says that if damages are recoverable against the whole
group, this will penalize members who voted against the expulsion.
231. This is not to say that there may not be intangible economic benefits, e.g., the
opportunity to meet clients.
232. 103 Ky. 415, 45 S.W. 360 (1898).
253. See also Gaines v. Farmer, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 601, 119 S.W. 874 (1909), where the
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The more realistic view is that taken by the court in Berrien v.
Pollitzer.24 The plaintiff was a member of the National Women's
Party, a non-stock, non-profit corporation established to obtain equality
for women. She claimed she was wrongfully expelled and sought an
injunction restraining the officers from denying her the use of the
organization's facilities. The court held that it could protect personal
rights and hence did not have to find a technical property right. The
real interest was associational membership, which it would protect. In
Randolph v. First Baptist Church of Lockland,25 the court enjoined
the wrongful expulsion of a member from a church congregation. It
found that there was a right to share in the assets upon dissolution,
which satisfied the requirement of a technical property right. However,
it took the position that even absent this, it would grant the injunction
to protect the personal interest, which it recognized as the real interest
that was involved.
On the other hand, most of the cases where a property right has been
found have involved associations where there was a substantial eco-
nomic interest in addition to or often instead of, any associational inter-
est. One situation is where the association offers sickness and death
benefits, or insurance programs, as do many fraternal societies. Thus,
whenever there are sums of money that will be payable to members
upon the happening of certain contingencies or at a certain time, the
courts unhesitatingly hold that they will consider whether the expulsion
was wrongful.2 36 The other situation is where the organization is a labor
union or trade association. Professor Chafee has referred to this as the
"strangle hold" policy.287 A person who is expelled from a trade union
cannot obtain work where the employer is under the closed or union
shop.288 If an apprentice is expelled from a craft union, he may never
be able to learn the trade. Here the courts are protecting economic
interests, and any associational right is incidental.2 9 The same is true
of trade associations. A person generally joins these not so much for
social intercourse with the other members (often his competitors) but
for the economic benefits that can be derived from such membership.
Examples of such associations would include a board of trade240 or an
court refused to determine title to office in an unincorporated association, where the posi-
tion was unsalaried.
234. Supra note 26.
235. 120 N.E.2d 485 (Ohio C.P. 1954).
236. See, e.g., Free Masons v. Valentine, 134 Md. 505, 107 Atd. 531 (1919) (burial funds
and widows allowances); Von Ark v. San Francisco Gruetli, 113 Cal. 377, 45 Pac. 685 (1896)
(life insurance); Mesisco v. Giuliana, 190 Mass. 358, 76 N.E. 907 (1906) (sick benefits).
237. Chafee, supra note 226, at 1022.
238. This is limited to a situation not pre-empted by federal legislation. Where federal
law is involved, a person who has paid his dues and initiation fees cannot be deprived of
work under a union shop arrangement, even though he is otherwise expelled from the
union.
239. For cases holding that the courts would consider the validity of an expulsion from
a labor union, see e.g., Holmes v. Brown, 146 Ga. 402, 91 S.E. 408 (1917); Krause v. Sander,
66 Misc. 601, 122 N.Y.S. 54 (1910); Heasley v. Operative Plasterers International Associa-
tion, 324 Pa. 257, 188 At. 206 (1936).
240. Ryan v. Cudhay, 157 Il1. 108, 41 N.E. 760 (1895).
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association of automobile dealers that put on exhibitions of new
models. 241
Where the concept of property right has caused an undesirable
result has been when the court did not find a technical property right,
but the association did offer substantial economic benefits. In Weyrens
v. Scotts Bluff Medical Society,242 the plaintiff, a physician, was ousted
from the county medical society for violating a rule prohibiting mem-
bers from doing work for indigents at reduced rates. There were no
assets as to which the member had a right, so the court held that the
absence of a property right precluded judicial relief. Without member-
ship in the association, however, the plaintiff could not practice at the
only hospital in the county having facilities permitting surgery in the
field in which the plaintiff specializedl The court held that this was at
most "an inconvenience," but that there was no property right in the
association, and thus refused relief.24, The court failed to distinguish
between a technical property right and substantial economic interest.
The association had a "strangle hold" on medical practice, and the
ouster substantially interfered with the plaintiff's opportunity to prac-
tice his profession and to make a living. The acme of absurdity and
mechanical jurisprudence is reached when a party would be entitled to
judicial relief if he had a right to a share of assets in the unlikely event
of dissolution, since he has a "property right," but is not when the
association is such that the practice of his profession in that area
depends on membership in the association.
A contrary result was reached in Bernstein v. Alameda-Contra Costa
Medical Assoc.,2"4 where a physician also was expelled from a county
medical society. The court, in holding that judicial relief was available,
said that it was not necessary that there be a property right, since there
was a contractual right. The result is sound, but the reasoning is not,
since in every membership situation there can be found to be a con-
tract between the members.245 Calling the relationship a contractual
one evades the real issue-is this the type of interest that the courts
will protect?246
The type of interest involved is the crux of the matter. Basically
there are two reasons a person joins an association: to obtain economic
advantage or to enjoy social, spiritual or other intangible relation-
ships. 247 The question should be whether the courts will protect either
241. Strong v. Minneapolis Trade Association, 151 Minn. 406, 186 N.W. 800 (1922).
242. 133 Neb. 814, 277 N.W. 378 (1938).
243. An alternative ground may have been failure to exhaust remedies within the
association, but the court indicated that the relief would be refused in any event because
of the absence of "property rights."
244. Supra note 224.
245. The contractual theory as a justification for the granting of relief has been crit-
icized as unnecessary. Pound, supra note 10, at 680; Chafee, supra note 226, at 1001-06.
Professor Chafee also maintained that this analysis would tend to obscure the real issues.
246. We will not be concerned with modern "key" clubs, which really involve con-
tracts for the furnishing of potables and entertainment rather than club membership.
247. Note that both economic and intangible benefits can be present in the same
association.
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or both of these interests by the injunctive process. The issue of the
existence of a property right is an irrelevancy. Since we have always
protected economic interests, there is no reason why we should not
protect them when they are represented by membership in an associa-
tion. The cases are sound insofar as they protect the rights to employ-
ment, commercial advantage, death benefits, insurance and the like.
Abandonment of the "property right" concept will prevent unsound
results as in the Weyrens case. Whenever a substantial economic inter-
est is involved in membership in an organization wrongful expulsion
should be enjoined.
The personal interest in belonging stands on a different footing. It
may be asked whether the judicial machinery should be employed to
protect this interest. The injury to feelings is not likely to be as in-
tense as that involved in the cases involving family relationships, the
right to be let alone or good reputation. Still, it should be protected
when, it is practicable to do so. In some of the cases where relief has
been denied because of the absence of a property right, the denial of
relief could have been justified on other grounds. Such a case is
Kaufman v. Plank.248 The plaintiff was a member of the Mennonite
Church, who had refused to obey a church ruling. As a result he was
"mitred," which meant that no one could associate with him. He sought.
an injunction requiring the lifting of the ban, which the court refused
on the ground that no property right was involved. A sounder reason
would have been that the court should not interfere in the relations
between a church and its members if it can possibly avoid it. The
court in that case did note that it must observe the boundary between
church and law when the only issue is whether a person is entitled to
membership. Professor Chafee has characterized this as the "dismal
swamp policy."2 49 Where the court gets involved with religious organ-
izations, it must master a new terminology and body of rules, and if
it errs it has interfered with the autonomy properly belonging to a
religious body. The nature of the church organization may be such
that the courts cannot decide the question of whether expulsion was
proper. Where the church is organized on a parochial basis such as
the Roman Catholic Church, and the rights of members are covered
by a body of Canon Law, the courts cannot hope to interfere without
using up an enormous amount of judicial time, as well as possibly
interfering with the free exercise of religion.2 50 The same reasoning
would hold true in the case of a group such as the Mennonite Church.
Where there is a dispute over church property, it may be necessary
for the court to decide these questions so that the church can continue
to function.2 51 Even in such a situation most courts will accept as
248. 214 Ill. App. 306 (1919).
249. Chafee, supra note 226, at 1023-26.
250. See the discussion in Chafee, id. at 1025 as regards interference with the Roman
Catholic Church.
251. But see Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North
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conclusive a ruling by the authorized church tribunal if one is avail-
able.252 It need not "get into the thicket" if the only question is
whether a particular member has been treated properly by the church.
This reasoning is inapplicable, however, when the church is organized
on a congregational basis, and the only question is whether the con-
gregation of which the person is a member has acted properly. In that
situation the court should hear the case unless a question of ecclesias-
tical law that is too complicated to resolve is involved. In Randolph
v. First Baptist Church,2 8 the court merely had to construe a state
charter and took jurisdiction. On the other hand, in Minton v.
Leavel, 25 4 the plaintiff sought to restrain the church officials from
ousting him for failure to sign a church covenant, claiming that the
pastor had no authority under church law to create such a covenant
and require members to sign it. The issue would involve questions
of church law, and the court refused to resolve it because of the ab-
sence of a property right. 56 The results in these cases should depend
on whether the court must construe complex questions of ecclesiastical
law and not on whether the member has a right in the assets of the
congregation.
On the other hand, where the question has been resolved by higher
authority the court should order reinstatement irrespective of whether
a technical property right can be found. In Connelly v. Masonic Mutual
Benefit Association,256 the issue was whether a party had been wrong-
fully expelled from a Masonic order.257 This is the type of organiza-
tion whose rules of membership are extremely complex, and in a suit
for reinstatement the court could properly refuse to take jurisdiction.
But here the Grand Master-the highest organizational official-had
ruled the party was not properly ousted and the court had only to
follow this ruling. Again, the question should be whether the court
can effectively resolve the question rather than whether there is a
property right. There is no need for the court to hide behind the
screen of "no property right"; instead it can truthfully state why it
cannot give relief.
The other reason that may justify hesitation to protect the associa-
America, 344 U.S. 94 (1952), where a legislative determination that one group was entitled
to control of church property was held to be unconstitutional.
252. The majority rule was established in Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679(1869). Accord as to the Masonic order: Connelly v. Masonic Order, 58 Conn. 552, 20 Atl.
671 (1890). Contra: Boyles v. Roberts, 222 Mo. 613, 121 S.W. 805 (1909).
253. Supra note 235.
254. 297 S.W. 615 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
255. See also Gibson v. Singleton, 149 Ga. 530, 101 S.E. 178 (1919), where the court
refused to enjoin the enforcement of a congregation's requirement that each member be
required to pay a fee in order to vote for trustees. The plaintiff contended that under
church law this requirement was illegal. The court held that no property rights were
involved and refused to grant relief.
256. Supra note 252.
257. The case involved an action by a widow for death benefits, and the issue was
whether her husband was a member at the time of death. There would have been no
difference in result if the suit were one for reinstatement.
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tional interest is the fear the disgruntled parties may use the courts
to resolve a dispute with the association without being concerned with
the protection of their associational interest. The answer to that
objection is to refuse relief unless the court finds the member is
genuinely interested in reinstatement. In Angland v. Doe,258 a plain-
tiff came before the court that decided Berrien v. Pollitzer, seeking a
declaratory judgment that a club had acted wrongfully in accepting
his undated resignation given two years earlier. He failed to ask for
reinstatement. The court held the complaint should be dismissed on
the ground that it was not the function of the court to decide whether
the club acted wrongfully unless the member wanted to protect his
interest in the associational relationship.
In summary, the concept of property right as a requirement for
injunctive relief serves absolutely no utility and causes some harm.
Where the member seeks membership either to protect economic
interests or his interest in the associational relationship, the court
should grant relief unless, because of the nature of the association
and the problems in determining the issue of wrongful expulsion,
it would be impracticable to hear the case. It should also be noted
that a member cannot obtain judicial relief until he has exhausted
all his remedies within the association 259 unless to do so would be
futile.2 60 This requirement will prevent the court's being used as
the forum to determine these disputes initially, and many may be
settled on the associational level without judicial interference. 261
Now that we have considered when the court will protect this
interest, we must consider the grounds on which the court will find
the expulsion unlawful. The grounds may be classified as those
relating to procedure and those relating to the substantive grounds
of expulsion. 26 2 The court obviously cannot decide whether the other
members should want to keep the plaintiff as a member. It can only
examine if the proper procedure was followed in ordering expulsion
and if the substantive grounds of expulsion are so unreasonable as
not to be judicially recognized.
As to proper procedure the first requirement is that the association
must have followed its own by-laws and rules. In this connection the
contractual nature of the associational relationship becomes significant.
Thus, in Free Masons v. Valentine,268 where the organizational rules
provided for trial prior to expulsion, a member expelled without
258. 263 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
259. Moody v. Farrington, 227 Ill. App. 40 (1922); Snay v. Lovely, 276 Mass. 159, 176
N.E. 791 (1931); Peters v. Minn. Dept. of Ladies of Grand Army of the Republic, 245 Minn.
563, 73 N.W.2d 621 (1955).
260. Heasley v. Operative Plasterers International Association, supra note 239; Wash-
ington Local Lodge v. International Brotherhood, 33 Wash. 2d 1, 203 P.2d 1019 (1949).
It is interesting to note that the facts in the Heasley and Lovely cases were essentially the
same, the only opportunity for appeal being at the next convention two years hence.
261. See the discussion of this point in Chafee, supra note 226, at 1019.
262. Professor Chafee analogizes this to due process. Id. at 1015-16.
265. Supra note 236.
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such a trial was entitled to an injunction ordering reinstatement.264
But this right can be waived. So where the by-laws provided for a
hearing before the grievance committee, but the plaintiff admitted
that the charges were true, it was held he waived this right, and rein-
statement was not ordered.265
The court, however, will order reinstatement if it considers the
procedure under which the member was expelled fundamentally un-
fair.2 6 6 In Von Ark v. San Francisco Gruetli, 67 the by-laws of the
association made no provision for a notice and hearing. The court
held that the absence of notice and hearing rendered the expulsion
illegal and ordered reinstatement. The same result was reached in
Washington Local Lodge v. Int'l Brotherhood,268 both as to expulsion
of individual members and expulsion of a local union from the
national. In Falls v. Musicians Protective Union,269 the court found
that the union did not give the plaintiff proper notice of the charges,
continued a meeting while he was absent, and held a meeting involv-
ing him on Sunday. This was found to be improper procedure and
reinstatement was ordered. And in Ryan v. Cudhay,2 70 the court held
that the association's failure to permit the plaintiff to introduce evi-
dence of his innocence rendered the proceedings unfair, and it ordered
reinstatement.
On the other hand, it is obvious that strict legal proceedings are
not required. The association can adopt the method it believes best
calculated to determine the truth of the charges so long as the member
has a fair opportunity to present his case.27' The notice of the charges
need not be the same kind as would be given in a judicial proceed-
ing.272 The member is not entitled to be represented by an attorney
unless this is provided in the by-laws.278 There need be no adherence
to formal rules of evidence,274 nor would it seem that the organization
is prohibited from requiring him to answer the charges a second time
unlike the situation of a criminal defendant. 275 Finally, a change in
the procedure subsequently to the time the plaintiff becomes a mem-
ber, such as trial before a board instead of the entire membership, is
not unfair.2 76 In other words, so long as the organization follows its
264. See also Richards v. Morison, 229 Mass. 532, 118 N.E. 868 (1918); Krause v.
Sander, supra note 239.
265. Monroe v. Colored Screwmen's Benevolent Association, supra note 224.
266. The "fundamentally unfair" doctrine may be somewhat analogous to the dual
standard applicable under the due process clause to state and federal criminal procedure.
See also the discussion in Chafee, supra note 226, at 1019-20.
267. Supra note 236.
268. Supra note 260.
269. 40 R.I. 34, 99 At. 823 (1917).
270. Supra note 240.
271. McConville v. Milk Wagon Drivers Union, 106 Cal. App. 696, 289 Pac. 852 (1930).
272. Peters v. Minn. Dept. of Ladies of Grand Army of the Republic, supra note 259.
273. Richards v. Morison, supra note 264.
274. Chafee, supra note 226, at 1016.
275. Ibid.
276. Schulz v. Supreme Tent, Knights of Maccabees, 236 S.W. 903 (Mo. App. 1922).
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own rules, and the member is given adequate notice, and an oppor-
tunity to be heard and to present his case, he has been given procedural
fairness. This approach is very sound and properly accommodates the
right of the member to fairness and that of the association to decide
how it wants to determine when expulsion is proper.
When the court deals with substantive grounds of expulsion, it
must tread most delicately lest it interfere with the very basis of the
associational relationship-the union of individuals for common pur-
poses. Professor Chafee has pointed out that a member may give up
certain rights by joining an association which he regains only upon
resignation.277 He gives the example of a member of a Republican
club who runs for office on the Democratic ticket. If it is held im-
proper to expel him on those grounds, the very purpose of the organ-
ization will have been defeated. He also points out that by becoming
a member of certain organizations the member knows full well that
he is submitting to autocratic rule and when he enters the organiza-
tion on those terms, he cannot later complain that he has been wrong-
fully excluded. He gives the example of a prophet who has established
a religious community and who demands strict adherence to his
discipline by the members. A modern example would be the John
Birch Society, whose program and rules have been established by a
single individual. When the courts have held ouster unjustified has
been where the right the organization claims to have been waived is
of a very substantial nature and the member's exercise of that right
would not destroy the purpose for which the organization exists.
The leading case holding an expulsion improper because of the
substantive ground assigned is Spayd v. Ringing Rock Lodge.278 There
by-laws of a railroad union prohibited a member from supporting
legislation opposed by the union or opposing legislation supported by
it. The plaintiff signed a petition supporting legislative review of the
Full Crew Act in Congress, which the union opposed. He was given
a fair hearing and when the violation was established, he was expelled.
The court ordered reinstatement on the ground that the by-law was
unenforcible as an attempt to abridge the member's right of petition.
It stated that the right of petition was not waived by joining a union.
The union can continue to operate as a labor union, even though an
individual member speaks out against a position taken by the union.
On the other hand, one of the prime purposes, indeed the most
significant one, of a labor union is to bargain collectively. When a
member refuses to abide by the collective bargaining agreement, his
action operates to destroy the prime purpose for which the union
was formed. Thus, in Flynn v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen,279
the court upheld the expulsion of a union member for seeking to
277. Chafee, supra note 226, at 1017-18.
278. 270 Pa. 67, 113 At. 70 (1921).
279. 111 Kan. 415, 207 Pac. 829 (1922).
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persuade the railroad to modify a seniority agreement formulated by
the union's bargaining committee.
2 8 0
An intermediate situation was presented in DeMille v. American
Association of Radio Artists,28 ' where an association by-law authorized
the use of association funds to support legislative proposals and pro-
vided for a special assessment. The plaintiff objected to the use of his
funds to support a particular proposal and refused to pay the assess-
ment. For this he was expelled. In his action to obtain reinstatement
the court upheld the validity of the rule and denied relief. It found
that the association was a distinct entity and that the member was
free to personally oppose the proposition. While to some extent his
right is violated because his money is used to support something he
opposes, nonetheless, unlike the situation in Spayd, he does remain
free to express his views. A contrary result would render a program
of lobbying difficult, since members could refuse to pay dues and
assessments if they disagreed with the union's position. The holding,
therefore, is sound; and the result is necessary if the association is to
carry out such a program.
In Stein v. Marks,212 the court held unenforcible a requirement of
a literary society, subsequently adopted, that all members belong to
a certain political party. It concluded that this bore no relationship
to the purpose for which the organization was created, and thus was
an unreasonable interference with the political rights of the mem-
bers.28
A very interesting case is Bernstein v. Alameda-Contra Costa Medical
Association,2 4 where two grounds for expulsion were alleged. In one
situation the physician was hired by an attorney to prepare a patho-
logical report of an autopsy done upon a killed worker. The re-
port was intended to be and was, turned over to the industrial
accident commission, which was deciding whether death occurred in
the course of employment. In making the report the physician referred
to the fact that the doctor who had done the autopsy was not a
"qualified pathologist." In fact that doctor was not certified, though
he had practiced extensively in the field. A by-law prohibited a
member from giving testimony before a court or judicial body that
should disparage another physician, and the plaintiff was expelled
for violation of that by-law. The court held that the by-law could not
be enforced. It observed that reports in judicial proceedings are
absolutely privileged and that the by-law could have an inhibiting
effect on the accuracy of the judicial proceedings. Consequently, its
280. Spayd was distinguished on the ground that there was no question of petitioning
a public official. The court said the issue was simply whether it was against public
policy for members of a union to agree to bargain collectively rather than individually.
281. 31 Cal. 2d 137, 187 P.2d 769 (1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 876 (1948).
282. 44 Misc. 140, 89 N.Y.S. 921 (1904).
283. See also Gallagher v. American Legion, 154 Misc. 81, 277 N.Y.S. 81, aff'd, 242 App.
Div. 604, 271 N.Y.S. 1012 (1934).
284. Supra note 224.
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enforcement would be against the public interest.28 5 Of similar vein
is Thompson v. Grant Int'l Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers,286
holding that members of a railroad union could not be expelled for
testifying as expert witnesses in a lawsuit against a railroad.
The other ground assigned for expulsion was that he said within
the hearing of another doctor's patient that the doctor should not
have ordered a Caesarian section performed on her. He was found to
be aware of her presence. The court held expulsion on this ground
was proper. The woman was not, his patient, and such conduct is
detrimental to the profession. Hence the requirement as applied
here was reasonable, and expulsion was upheld. The cases in this
area have been soundly decided, and the courts have not improperly
intruded into the right of an association to set proper standards for
membership.
As to the associational relationship--the right to belong-we must
distinguish between protection of economic interests and social and
intangible interests in such relationships. Both should be protected
irrespective of any question of "property rights." The courts have
wisely limited their review to procedural fairness and to substantive
grounds that involve substantial rights of the members, the exercise
of which does not violate the purpose for which the association was
organized nor interfere with its effective operation. What is needed
is the full recognition that the interest in associational relationships
is to be protected without regard to the fiction of a "property right."
CIVIL RIGHTS
This section involves what may be called the "miscellaneous" of
personal interests. The term, "civil rights" is used in a variety of
contexts. We say that a convict loses "civil rights," such as the right
to vote. Legislation designed to prevent racial discrimination against
the Negroes and other minority groups is termed "civil rights" legis-
lation. Professor deFuniak has defined civil rights as "those rights
one enjoys as regards other individuals rather than those in relation
to the establishment and administration of the government, the latter
being political rights."28 17 This definition is much too broad to be
285. The court observed as follows:
The policy of making such statements privileged is obvious. If parties and wit-
nesses were subject to slander and libel actions for utterances made or filed in a
judicial proceeding the administration of justice would be hampered and the judicial
rocess throttled. The same policy should ban a medical association by-law which
olds over each of the members the threat of expulsion if in his testimony (oral
or written) before a court or other judicial body he "disparages by comment or
insinuation," another physician. With such a threat ever facing him, he must weigh
carefully and well his every utterance lest through some slip of the tongue he "in-
sinuate" something about another physician which his county medical council may,
perchance, deem "disparaging" and, as such, just cause for censure, suspension or
expulsion. It is inconceivable that the law could tolerate the holding of such a sword
of Damocles over every medical witness in any judicial proceeding. 293 P.2d at 865.
286. 41 Tex. Civ. App. 176, 91 S.W. 834 (1905). This was an action to recover damages
for the wrongful expulsion.
287. de Funiak, supra note 11, at 22.
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useful. Nor does it help to call them rights other than property or
contractual that one enjoys; we have previously discussed other per-
sonal rights that are recognized. I think that the best way to define
a civil right is in terms of a right to carry on legitimate activities
without improper interference, either private or governmental 28 8
and with the degree of dignity usually associated with membership
in a free society. If this sounds too general, the answer is admittedly
so; but at least it points out the direction in which we are looking.
Basically the cases can be put into two categories: non-discrimination
and interference with expression. We are not now concerned with
"political rights," that is rights involving the electoral process such
as the right to vote or hold office.
Non-discrimination
In the absence of statute private individuals can discriminate in the
operation of their activities, even though they may open the use of
such activities to the general public. So long as the government is not
involved, no constitutional question is presented, and at common law
there is the right to discriminate. 289 We are not now concerned with
the "common callings." But in some states and localities discrimina-
tion is prohibited in the operation of activities open to the public
such as parks, swimming pools, theaters, Testaurants and the like.
The issue is whether injunctive relief is available to secure admission.
It has been said that the very nature of a "civil right" makes
damages and other remedies inadequate,2 90 and that an injunction is
the most efficacious remedy because of its "unique flexibility" and
its capacity for eliminating the risks inherent in the defendant's acting
first and defending a prosecution later.291 Both observations are correct.
Where dignity-an intense personal interest-is involved, damages
can never be adequate. Criminal prosecution is never an adequate
remedy, since it generally cannot be initiated by the injured indi-
vidual and, in any event, cannot guarantee enjoyment of the right
created. An injunction insures enjoyment in the future, and if the suit
is maintained as a class action, guarantees that the facility will be
operated on a non-discriminatory basis.
Research has disclosed only three cases involving the issue of the
availability of an injunction against discrimination in the operation
of facilities open to the public. In Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club,29 2
statute required that all operators of public accommodations had to
admit any person over twenty-one who paid the admission price
288. See the discussion, supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
289. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). In 1964 Congress enacted the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241, 42 U.S.C. 1971 (1964), which prohibits discrimination in public
accommodations where interstate commerce is affected or where such discrimination is
supported by state action. Under section 204(a) injunctive relief is expressly authorized.
290. de Funiak, supra note 11, at 22.
291. Moscovitz, supra note 11, at 144-45.
292. Supra note 25.
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except for certain standard reasons such as drunkenness or disorderly
conduct. The plaintiff was refused admission to a race track and
sought an injunction. The statute provided that any person wrong-
fully ejected or refused admittance could recover damages of at least
$100 in addition to any actual damages. The defendant argued that
the statutory remedy was exclusive, since the statute created a right
unknown to the common law. The court held that the rule of strict
construction was inapplicable, as it did not form a part of the Cali-
fornia Civil Code. The court emphasized that actual damages would
be "extremely difficult if not impossible" to prove and that $100
was an insignificant recovery. It concluded that:
The positive declaration of the personal right and the importance
of its preservation together with the inadequacy of the remedy by
way of damages and the $100 penalty furnish sufficient reason for
injunctive relief.293
The same result was reached in Everett v. Harron.294 Statute pro-
vided that all persons were entitled to equal enjoyment of public
accommodations, and provided criminal penalties for violation. The
plaintiff had been refused admittance to the defendant's swimming
pool and sought injunctive relief. The court held the injunction
should be granted. Since the statute created a "right," it also was
intended to create a remedy, which for an excluded individual meant
a civil remedy.295 It observed that where a statute created a specific
duty for the benefit of the public, violation of the statute was deemed
to create an action for damages. But since damages would not be
adequate because of the very nature of the interest and since there
would have to be a multiplicity of suits, injunctive relief was proper.
However, in Fletcher v. Coney Island, Inc.,296 the court held that an
individual refused admission to a public park because of her race
could not obtain injunctive relief. The statute provided criminal
liability and also civil liability, authorizing recovery of between $50
and $500 damages. The court held that the legislature intended to bar
injunctive relief, since it did not expressly authorize it. It emphasized
that since the statute created rights unknown to the common law,
it should be strictly construed.
It is difficult to see how a statute prohibiting certain conduct evi-
dences a legislative intent to benefit the wrongdoer by depriving the
courts of what they--charged with enforcement of the statute-deem
the most efficient remedy to eliminate an evil the legislature found
existed. It can be contended with equal cogency that the provision
for damages was intended to insure that the plaintiff recovered some
money, but not too much. The legislature may have realized that
293. 180 P.2d at 325.
294. Supra note 27.
295. The statute also referred to "presumptive evidence in any criminal or civil pro-
ceeding," a point relied upon by the court.
296. 165 Ohio St. 150, 134 N.E.2d 371 (1956).
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damages are completely speculative, and wanted to insure some recov-
ery. At the same time it did not feel that the injury is such that heavy
damages should be awarded. Whether injunctive relief is available
then becomes a matter of statutory construction. Since the legislature
was intending to benefit people denied equal accommodations, and
since an injunction is the more efficacious remedy, it is submitted that
injunctive relief should be granted unless specifically prohibited by
the legislature. These statutes are becoming more numerous, as the
struggle for equality becomes more pronounced. The legislature can
prevent such disputes by specifically authorizing injunctive relief. If
it has not, then it is submitted that the results in Orloff and Harron
are more in keeping with the probable legislative intent, and injunc-
tive relief should be granted.
Expression
One situation in this area arises out of the desire to protect the rest of
the public from reading or seeing things that, for one reason or another,
are deemed deleterious. And, of course, individuals have a right to
advise other members of the public that they should not read or see
certain things. This is part of their right to free expression and must
be protected. If A publishes a book that B considers undesirable, he
must be free to advise C not to read it. If B does not like a movie that
A is showing at this theater, he certainly has the right to advise people,
by signs or otherwise, that the movie will corrupt their morals. If
this results in A's losing patronage, then this is a risk he must bear as
the price of free discussion in an open society. He must convince
the public that the movie is desirable. Equally clear is the fact that
B may not physically prevent people from entering A's theater or
destroy the printing presses on which A prints his book. In other
words, he may compete in the marketplace of ideas, but may not
resort to improper means to prevent A from expressing his ideas.
The question is whether he may use the threat of criminal prosecu-
tion against third parties to prevent them from distributing A's
material. In American Mercury v. Chase,297 the Watch and Ward
Society, of which the defendant was secretary, scrutinized books and
magazines to determine if they were "objectionable." Once a publica-
tion was found to "offend" it might be expected that the defendants
would seek criminal prosecution or would attempt to persuade the
public not to read the publication or distributors not to handle it.
Instead it advised distributors that if they did not remove the offending
publication, criminal prosecutions would be instigated against the
distributor. In an action by a publisher to enjoin such action, the
court found such conduct improper. As a practical matter, it found
that the threat of prosecution would be sufficient to deter the dealers
from handling the publication. Rather than risk criminal prosecu-
297. 13 F.2d 224 (D. Mass. 1926).
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tions most dealers would simply refuse to handle the work. The court
analogized the situation to an illegal secondary boycott. The defend-
ant had a right to institute criminal prosecution; it had a right to
express its views as to the propriety or legality of a publication. But
it did not have the right to rely on in terrorem tactics which did not
reach the merits of the publications. Obviously it was relying on the
threat of suit to prevent the dissemination of material it deemed
objectionable. This was considered to be unfair means and was
enjoined. So too, if a defendant picketed a theater in an attempt to
compel the theater owner to cease showing an objectionable film, this
would be within his rights. But if he continued picketing when other
films not objectionable were being shown or otherwise attempted to
cause a boycott unless the theater operator would show only those
films of which he approved, this would clearly be improper. The law
will not recognize unofficial censorship when accompanied by means
other than fair persuasion with respect to the offending publication. 298
Another case involving expression is Schwartz v. Edrington,ng where
the plaintiff asserted a right to keep silent.800 He was tricked into signing
the defendant's petition for office and sought to enjoin the defendant
from publishing the petition with his signature in a newspaper. The
court granted the injunction, observing that the defendant was not
being denied the right to publish his sentiments as guaranteed by the
state constitution, but could not publish the sentiments of the plaintiff
against his will.80 1 Of similar import is Local 309 v. Gates,02 where the
court enjoined state policemen from attending the meetings of a
labor union out on strike, concluding that such attendance inhibited
free discussion at the meetings, as it was no doubt intended to do.
These cases demonstrate the availability of injunctive relief to
protect "civil rights." As discussed previously, damages are necessarily
inadequate and injunctive relief is proper. With the abandonment
of the personal-property right distinction, injunctive protection of
many interests relating to human dignity and enjoyment can be
assured.
CONCLUSION
The concept that "equity protects only property rights" has been
another injury to the administration of justice that has resulted from
298. The Supreme Court has recently held that a state statute authorizing public
officials to advise distributors that publications were obscene and requesting them to
remove such publications was an unconstitutional abridgement of free expression. Bantam
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963). Other courts have enjoined such action taken
without statutory authorization. See, e.g., New American Library of World Literature v.
Allen, 114 F. Supp. 823 (N.D. Ohio 1953).
299. 133 La. 235, 62 So. 660 (1913).
300. The right to keep silent forms part of the first amendment's guarantee. See, e.g.,
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
301. Compare Somerville v. Horsley, 195 Misc. 961, 91 N.Y.S.2d 605 (1949), where the
injunction against the use of the plaintiff's name as a supporter was refused, since the
defendant had agreed to cease such use and the plaintiff's repudiation had received
extensive publicity.
302. 75 F. Supp. 620 (N.D. Ind. 1948).
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the historical concept of "law and equity" as separate systems of law.
Today it is recognized that injunctive relief is available to protect all
substantial interests, and the court need not struggle to find a technical
"property right." Because of the intensity of feeling generated by
personal rights, damages will usually not be adequate. The issue then
becomes one of practicability. The very intenseness of personal in-
terests which makes damages inadequate for their enforcement may
make it equally impracticable to attempt such enforcement. There
are limits on the power of courts to regulate the intimate personal
relationships between human beings. The courts should recognize
this limitation on their power and be wary lest they issue decrees that
are unenforcible or impose too great a strain on personal liberty.
However, when the interest of a plaintiff is found to be substantial,
when the conduct of the defendant is found to be wrongful, and when
no public interest or question of practicability militates against the
granting of relief, the process of injunction should be employed to give
full protection to those rights which in the final analysis, are often those
that make life worth living.
